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TRIPS: ADEQUATE PROTECTION, INADEQUATE
TRADE, ADEQUATE COMPETITION POLICY
Hanns Ullricht
Abstract. This article analyzes the relationship between trade and competition policy with respect to intellectual property, focusing particularly on the inclusion into the
Uruguay Round of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property ("TRIPS"). The
article sets forth the traditional framework of protection as established by the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property in 1883. The TRIPS agreement
provides new rules and principles to manage emerging problems in the field of industrial
property. The main focus of this article is to analyze the effect that TRIPS will have on
harmonizing (but not unifying) the system of intellectual property protection.
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INTRODUCTION

The Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations ("MTN") was signed on December 15, 1993.
The Parties to the new "Multilateral Trade Organization" ("MTO") entered
into an "Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods."' This MTO has subsequently
become the World Trade Organization ("WTO"). The so-called TRIPSAgreement is an integral part of the WTO-overall agreement. It reaffirms
basic principles of international intellectual property protection like that of
national treatment or of most-favored-nation treatment (arts. 3 and 4). It also
sets up "adequate standards and principles concerning the availability, scope,
and use of trade-related intellectual property rights" (preamble; art. 9 et seq.).
Moreover, it provides for "effective and appropriate means for the
enforcement of trade-related intellectual property rights" (preamble, art. 41 et
seq.), as well as for "reasonable procedures and formalities" for the
acquisition and maintenance of intellectual property rights (art. 62).
For the first time, an international convention has been set up to harmonize the law of copyright, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial
designs, patents, topographies of integrated circuits, and trade secrets in their
entirety. This revolutionary effort "to reduce distortions and impediments to
international trade" is made as an annex to the general WTO-Agreement: on
the basis of a package deal of trade concessions. Though it had been strongly
opposed in the beginning by developing countries, 2 it certainly does not
1 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in 33
I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994); official English and German texts
in Gesetz vomn 30. August 1994 zu dent
Obereinkonimen voin 15. April 1994 zur Errichtung der Welthandelsorganisation,BGBI 11 1438, 1565,
1730 (1994). For an overview of the WTO, see Jansen, Die neue Welthandelsorganisation(Vorld Trade
Organization - WTO), Europtaisches Zeitschrift fir Wirtschafl 193 (1994) [hereinafter EuZW]" for a first
critical evaluation, see Oppermann & Beise, Die neue Welthandelsorganisation- ein stabilesRegelwerk
ftr den Welthandel? Europaarchiv 195 (1994) [hereinafter EuArch].
2 This opposition was framed in the form of an objection to the mandate of the Uruguay Round to
deal with subjects other than trade in counterfeit goods, see Bail, Elaborationof Trade Related Principles,
Rules andDisciplinesfor IntellectualPropertyRights, in A NEW GATT FOR THE NINETIES AND EUROPE

92, 245. 247 (Oppermann & Molsberger eds., 1991); Assmann & Buck, Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights: Limitation of the Mandate or Point of Reference for the Further
Development of the GAT in A NEW GATT FOR THE NINETIES AND EUROPE, supra at 261; Cottier, The

Prospects for Intellectual Property in GAT, 28 COMMON MARKET L. REv. 383. 386: Stoll,
TECHNOLOGIETRANSFER - INTERNATIONAUSIERUNGS- UND NATIONALISIERUNGSTENDENZEN

333 (1994).

Subsequently, the attitudes became more moderate, see UNCTAD, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT
1991 179 (1990); Braga, The Economics of IntellectualPropertyRight and the GATT: A View from the
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constitute that part of the deal that could have put it into jeopardy during
national ratification procedures. 3 In fact, as the WTO gains importance, the
TRIPS-Agreement is bound to govern international intellectual property
protection on a global scale.
The TRIPS-Agreement is concerned with trade, not with competition.
It aims at the reduction of distortions and impediments to trade, and in so
doing, pays almost as little attention to competition as does the WTO in
general. The TRIPS-Agreement allows for national measures to prevent the
abuse of intellectual property rights or practices which unreasonably restrain
trade (art. 8 para 2; art. 31 lit. k). It also alludes to licensing practices which
may have adverse effects on trade or on competition and which, therefore,
Member States may outlaw by national legislation (art. 40).4 Nothing in the
Agreement seems to cast a shadow of doubt on the trade-enhancing,
distortion-reducing effects of an internationally harmonized system of
intellectual property protection.
The prospect of harmony between
intellectual property and trade kindles critical academic interest much more
than the pernicious licensing practices. The Agreement does not deal with
these practices which have been widely discussed, 5 and may well be
6
overcome with some effort.
South. 22 VAND. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 243 (1989). For a general critique, see Ullrich, GA7T. Industrial
Property Protection, Fair Trade and Development, in GATT OR WIPO? NEw WAYS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 127 (Beier & Schricker eds., 1989) [hereinafter
GATT oR WIPO?]. This article is not concerned with the TRIPS issues relevant for developing countries,
but with trade and competition in general, and trade and competition among industrialized or newly
industrialized countries, i.e. actual competitors, in particular. Note that GATI art. 65
2, 4 and arts.
66-67 provide for some transitional rules for developing and least developed countries, as well as for
assistance by way of technical cooperation.
3 In general, TRIPS has been hailed as a major success of the Uruguay Round. See GATT
NegotiatorsHail TRIPS Pactas Success, 47 Pat. Trademark & CopyrightJ. (BNA) 222 (1994); Uruguay
Round of GATT Talks Are Concluded With 1P Provisions,47 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J.(BNA) 170
(1993). For German reaction, see Bundesregierung, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zu dem Obereinkommen vom
15. April 1994 zur Errichtung einer Welthandelsorganisation Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 12/7655
(neu) at 344 etseq.; see also Oppermann & Baumann, HandelsbezogenerSchutz geistigen Eigentums
(TRIPS) in, GAT, EuArch 1994. at 121. Such basic approval does not prevent interested circles from
desiring additional improvements. See Bill would Amend Trade Act to Take Account of GA T-TRIPS
Implementation, 48 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J.(BNA) 169 (1994) (reporting on a post-Uruguay
Round strategy of improving intellectual property protection abroad).
4 The language ofart. 40, 1-2 is confusing, since 1 seems to imply that only restraints of competition affecting trade may be outlawed, while 2 refers to restrictive practices and covenants as such,
but apparently condemns them "inparticular cases" only. Even for the restrictions as grave as exclusive
grant-backs, there are no challenge clauses and coercive package licensing. In fact, industrialized
countries reportedly have opposed the introduction of any rules that would go beyond the Chicago School
thinking prevalent at the time of negotiating TRIPS. See Cottier, supra note 2, at 409.
5 There is a whole body of U.S.. E.E.C.. and German antitrust law and scholarly discussion on its
modes and scope of application. With regard to patents, see generally Wedekind, Die ANWENDUNG DER
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Therefore, rather than (re-)investigating into the intellectual property/antitrust-interface and its international dimensions, this article attempts to
analyze the TRIPS-Agreement merely in its own terms as an instrument of
trade liberalization. The concern here is only with the positive and negative
effects of TRIPS on international trade. This attempt must remain limited in
several respects. First, the focus will be on the trade-related aspects of those

intellectual property rights that in one way or the other protect technology,
such as patents, trade secrets, and software-copyright. 7 Second, although this
article's subjects are the trade-related aspects of technology protection, the

8
analysis undertaken is a legal one, not one of international trade theory.
Third, the TRIPS-Agreement clearly assumes that intellectual property rights

are the coins with which to pay the entrance fee into free international trade.
However, the trade-restrictive effects of intellectual property are outside the
scope of this article. 9 Rather, the focus is on whether international
KARTELLVORSCHRIFTEN DES EWG-VERTRAGE AUF PATENTLIZENZVERTRAGE - EINE UNTERSUCHUNG DER
PRAXIS DER ORGANE DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN UNTER BEROCKSICHTIGUNG DES
AMERIKANISCHEN KARTELLRECHTS (1989); and see generally OECD, COMPETITION POLICY AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (1989).
6 One post-modem construction has been proposed by the International Antitrust Code Working
Group and appears to rely on the rather conservative "scope of the patent" approach. See DRAFT
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST CODE, at 128 (1994).
7 Copyright in general is beyond my present interest, as are industrial designs, trademarks, or geographical indications. As regards copyrights, see Correa, 7RIPS Agreement: Copyright and Related
Rights, 25 INT'LREV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 543 (1994), and references, infra note 90.
8 1 can do no better than point out the implications which the TRIPS Agreement may have for
international trade as a matter of law;, i.e., I shall attempt to show the legal opportunities which it offers
for increasing or for controlling international trade. As for international trade theory and its relationship
to technical change in general, there appears to be only limited literature dealing specifically with
intellectual property and international trade. See Jussawalla, THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN A WORLD WITHOUT FRONTIERS - A STUDY ON COMPUTER SOFTWARE 21, 33 (1992); Scherer,
Research on Patents and the Economy: The State of the Art. in EPO/ IFO=INsTrrTE FOR ECONOMIC
RESEARCH, RESULTS AND METHODS OF ECONOMIC PATENT RESEARCH 41, 47 (1993) [hereinafter RESULTS
AND METHODS]; Frischtak, Harmonization Vlersus Differentiation in IntellectualPropertyRight Regimes.
in NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY 89 (Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter GLOBAL DIMENSIONS]; and Sherwood,
Why a Uniform IntellectualPropertySystem Mfakes Sense for the World. supra at 68, 79.
9 This reverse side is already much discussed as a matter of the economics of the patent system and
needs no rehearsal here, since its arguments equally apply to national and international protection of intellectual property. See David, IntellectualPropertyInstitutionsand Panda'sThumb: Patents, Copyrights,
and Trade Secrets in Economic Theory and History,in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 8, at 19; Scherer.
in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 8; Merges & Nelson, On the Complex Economics of the PatentScope,
90 COLUM. L. REv. 839, 868 (1990); Audretsch, The Competitive and Technological Effects of Patents:
A CriticalAssessment of the Relevant Literature in Industrial Economics, in RESULTS AND METHODS,
supra note 8, at 173; Kaufer. THE ECONOMICS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM passim (1988); PATENTWESEN,
TECHNISCHER FORTSCHRrrT UND WETTBEWERB, (Oppenlilnder ed.. 1984). It should be noted that the
Continental understanding of copyright protection for works of literature and the arts does not share the
economic rationale assumed by Anglo-American legal thinking (compare Gordon, An Inquiry into the
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harmonization of national intellectual property produces effects which
specifically concern international trade, either by virtue of the particular
protection granted for a given intangible good, or by virtue of the way it is
granted, namely on a territorial basis.
Obviously, such effects will depend on the way the goods covered by
intellectual property rights are produced and traded internationally. These
ways, in turn, are conditioned by the means and modes enterprises use to
compete in the international marketplace. Therefore, it will not be possible to
maintain the distinction between trade and competition-related aspects of
international intellectual property protection. However, the analysis will stop
where the trade aspects begin to take on aspects of competition. Therefore,
this article will discuss only those features of TRIPS that form the
background against which restrictions of technological competition should be
assessed.
I shall first outline the system of international intellectual property
protection as it worked in the past (and as it will continue to exist on a level
below the WTO). Then I will explain the structure and the working of the
TRIPS-Agreement. Finally, I will discuss some of its effects on international
trade and technological competition.
II.

FROM PARIS AND BERNE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND: SETTING THE
STAGE

A.

The Traditional Framework of International Intellectual Property
Protection

The international protection of technological property has been governed by three interdependent principles: 1)territoriality of protection; 2)
national treatment of foreign owners of national intellectual property; and 3)
international minimum protection. The combined application of these three
principles is a tribute to both national sovereignty and open national markets.

Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency Consent and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L.
REv. 1343 (1989) andReichman, Goldstein on Copyright Law: A Realist'sApproach to a Technological
Age, 43 STAN. L. Rev. 943 (1991) with Schricker, Urheberrechtzwischen Industrie- und Kulturpolitik,
GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHERBERRECT 1992, 242 (1992) [hereinafter GRURI. However, for
the purposes of this article, these differences do not matter very much, since the article touches upon
copyright only to the extent that computer software is concerned. For software, copyright protection certainly does not flow from traditional European droit d'auteurconcepts.

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

1.

VOL. 4 No. I

The Principleof Territoriality

Determining whether and on what conditions a private individual may
claim, exploit, and enforce an exclusivity for a piece of knowledge represents
a formidable issue of public policy, 10 because of its effects on the flow,
availability of human learning, and technological competition of the
marketplace."l Moreover, for patents and utility models, trademarks and
designs, 12 such exclusive rights - though normally available as a matter of

rightl3 - are awarded by a specific administrative grant. 14

International protection generally is governed by the principle of

territoriality. As a matter of public policy,1 5 the acquisition, existence,
maintenance, validity, scope, and termination of the exclusive right are determined by the law of the state for the territory for which protection is

10 For patent theories, see MACHLUP. AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, STUDY No.
15, U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 19
(1958); for the development of the concept of private property in inventions (rather than the grant of a
state concession). In Germany, see WaIz, DER SCHUTZINHALT DES PATENTRECHTS IM RECHT DER
WET-BEWERBSBESCHRAKUNGEN 94, 120 (1973). Wadle, DER EINFLUB FRANKREICHS AUF DIE
ENTwIcKLUNO GEWERBLICHER SCHUTZRECHTE IN DEUTSCHLAND, GEDACHTNISSCHRIFT CONSTANTINESCO
871, 890 (1988). The U.S. had a different, but not unrelated patent law development. See Lubar, The
Transfornation ofAntebellum PatentLau, 32 TECH. & CULTURE 932 (1991).
SCf references, supra note 9.
12 Trademark and designs, however, may also be acquired ex lege by use (common law trademark
in the U.K. and the U.S., designs under art. 1. 2(a). 12, 20 of the proposed Regulation for a Community
Design, Official Journal of the European Communities, C 29. 20 (1994)), and that their protection is akin
to the protection against unfair competition (passing off). Therefore. general conflicts of law rules for
torts and the principle of territoriality may need to be reconciled, generally in favor of the principle of
territoriality. See Kreuzer inMONCHENER KOMMENTAR, art. 38, annot., 241 (2d ed. 1990); Ulmer, DIE
IMMATERIALGOTERRECHTE IM INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHT 21 (1975); Schricker, in UWG
GROBKOMMENTAR, Einleitung annot., F 168 (Jacobs et al. eds.. 1994).
13 Cf Bernhardt & Kra.ler, LEHRBUCH DES PATENTRECHTS 19, 196 (4th ed. 1986). For the function
of patent formalities, see KraBer. Erfindungsschutz zwischen Patentanmeldung und Patenterteilung.
GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT INTERNATIONALER TEIL, 1990, at 732 [hereinafter
GRUR INT'L].
14 Copyright protection generally arises from creation of the work. Registration, if provided for at
all, only serves legal transparency. The incentive for registration results from improved enforcement (cf.
17 U.S.C §§ 401, 411, 501(b)). Nevertheless, with the exception of moral rights, copyright protection is
subject to the principle of territoriality, see § *17 II, 120 UrhG; Katzenberger in KOMMENTAR ZUM
URJEBERRECHT vor § 120 if, annot., 69 (Schricker ed., 1987),[hereinafter KOMMENTAR]; Ulmer,
Gewerbliche Schutzrechte und Urheberrechte im internationalen Privatrecht, 41 RABELSZ 479, 492
(1977). But the position of some countries is ambiguous; for France, see art. L 111-4 c. prop. int..
COLOMBET. PROPRIIIt LITTERAIRE ET ARTIsTIQUE ET DROITs VOISINS, Sub. Nos. 445, 454 (6th ed. 1992).
15 See BGH ofJune 17. 1992, 24 INT'LREV. INDUS. PROP. & CoPYR]GHT L. 539, 541 (1993) -"'Alf';
Ullmann in PATENTGESETZ, GEBRAUCHSMUSTERGESETZ, § 15. annot., 134 (Benkard ed., 9th ed. 1993)
[hereinafter PATENTGESETZ].
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sought. 16 Consequently, intellectual property, whether it is a patentable invention or a copyrightable work,' 7 is national by nature. Therefore, it must
be acquired, maintained, and defended independently from one country to the
other. In fact, the conditions governing the acquisition, existence,
maintenance, validity, scope, and termination of intellectual property vary
widely from one country to the other.' 8
The privilege granted to the owner of the intellectual property to exclusively exploit a right, 19 extends to the entire territory of the state granting

protection, but is also limited to this territory. Thus, it is the law of the
territory where an act of exploitation has been committed which, in terms of
conflicts of laws, determines whether such an act constitutes an infiingement. 20 Additionally, the infiinging acts (or the acts of exploitation reserved
to the intellectual property owner) are limited in their territorial scope: It is
only the domestic manufacture, use, sale, 2' reproduction, distribution,
performance, or display which is covered by a national patent or copyright.
This approach affords the owner of the monopoly of exploitation for
the national market, and for this market only. It is assumed that the national
16 Ulmer, DIE IMMATERIALG0TERRECHTE IM INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHT 8, 12, et passim
(1975b For

patents

see

Stauder,

PATENTVERLETZUNG

IM

GRENZOBER-SCHREITENDEN

6, 13 (1975); Ullmann in PATENTGESETz, supra note

15, at Einleitung,
Internationaler Teil, annot., 1. For copyrights, see supra note 14. As for the specific problems of the international satellite transmission of copyrightable works, see Dietz, Copyright and Satellite Broadcast, 20
INT'L REv. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 135 (1989); Rumphorst, Broadcasting ofFilms via Satellite, 41
(4) EBU REv. 34 (1990). For trade secrets, the situation is somewhat complicated as trade secrets are not
protected by an exclusive right but by the law of torts or the law.of unfair competition. Nevertheless, the
law governing the acquisition of trade secret protection is that of the country where protection is claimed
(principle of territoriality), while the acts of infringement, i.e., breach of confidence or theft, are determined in accordance with the conflict of law rule
for unfair competition. In general, this, again, will be
the law governing the market affected by the violation of the secret. See Ullrich in DER tNTERNATIONALE
SoFTWAREVERTRAG, Teil 1, Kap. I. § 4IIB2m (Ullrich & K6mer eds.. 1995) [hereinafter
SoFrwAREVERTRAGI.
18 See infra Part II.A.2.c of this article.
19 The privilege is of a different scope for patents (make, use. and sell) and copyrights (reproduce.
adapt, distribute, perform and display). Compare 35 U.S.C. § 271 and 17 U.S.C. § 106 with § 9 PatG and
§ 15 UrhG.
20 Since the damage done by an act of infringement is the market loss occurring as a result of an act
of exploitation on the market, the places where the 'tort" has been committed and the place where it has
been completed are considered to be always identical with respect to the application of the lex loci delicti.
See Max-Planck-Instituteftr ausldndischesund internationalesPatent-, Urheber- und Wettbewerbsrecht,
Stellungnahmne zum Entwurf eines Geseizes zur Erganzung des internationalen Privatrechts
(ausservertraglicheSchuldverhaltnisse und Sachen), GRUR INT'L 1985, 104, 106 [hereinafter MAX
PLANCK INSTITrrTE]; Katzenberger in KoMMENTAR, supranote 14, at § 120 if.annot., 81.
21 Cf 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) CWithin the United States"); § 9. No. 2,PatG; § 17 UrhG; MAX-PLANcKINsTrrurE, supra note 20. at 106; Bruchhausen in PATENTGESEtZ, supra note 15, at § 9, annot., 8, 10.
WIRTSCHAFTSVERKEHR
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market will yield profits as a reward, which are tantamount to the merits of
the invention or work as defined by the granting conditions. This is why, on
the one hand, territorial protection is granted against imports and offers for
importation, 22 whether direct or parallel. Specifically, except in the case of
trademarks, 23 importation of goods that have been lawfully put on markets
outside the domestic territory, by the owner of the exclusive right himself or
with his consent, generally constitutes an infringement. This would be an
infringement even if the first sales abroad have been made on the basis of a
parallel right of exclusivity (no extraterritorial exhaustion) 24 since such importation may affect the monopoly yield of the national market. On the other
hand, the privilege granted by a national intellectual property law will not, in
principle, extend to acts of exploitation made with respect to foreign
25

markets.
Although this principle has never been followed entirely, 26 it remains a
basic tenet of international intellectual property law. An extraterritorial
protection of national intellectual property distorts competition on foreign
markets having different intellectual property regimes. It may be less bene22 Cf 35 U.S.C. § 271(g); 17 U.S.C. § 602; § 9. PatG; Katzenberger in KOMMENTA1, supra note
14, at 120 if, annot., 85.
21 BGH of January 22, 1964, GRUR INT'L 1964, 202 - "Maja"; of February 2, 1973, 4 INT'L REV.
INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 432 (1973) - "Cinzano"; Beier, Territorialitltdes Markenrechis und
internationaler Wirtschaftsverkehr, GRUR INT'L 1968, at 8; Riehle, MARKENRECHT UND
PARALLELIMPORT 209, 232 (1968); Beier & von Mfihlendahl, Der Grundsatz der internationalen
Erschopfung des Markenrechts in den Mitgliedstaatender EG und ausgewvahlten Drittstaaten, Mitt. Pat.
Anw. 1980, at 101.
24 For patents, see BGH of June 6, 1976, 8 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHTL. 64 (1977) "Tylosin"; Bruchhausen in PATENTOESETz, supra note 15, at § 9, annot., 15, 21; for copyrights, see
Loewenheim in KOMMENTAR. supra note 14, at § 17, annot., 22, 24; the leading Community case is Court
of Justice of February 9, 1982. case 270/80, Polydor/Harlequin Record, Rep. 1982, 329; 12 INT'L REV.
INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHTL. 499 (1982). Non-exhaustion by acts done outside the Community has been
confirmed by the EC-Legislature in art. 4, lit c, Computer program directive (OJEC 1991 L 122, 42); art.
76, Community Patent Convention (OJEC 1989, L 401, 10); art. 24, Draft Community Design (OJEC
1994 L 29, 20); even for trademarks, the E.C. has limited recourse to acts of sale made within the
Community. See art. 7, Trademark Directive (OJEC 1989, L 40,1); art. 13, Community Trademark
(OJEC 1994 L 11, 1). For a critique, see Beier, Industrial Propertyand the FreeMovement of Goods in
the Internal EuropeanMarket, 21 INT'LREV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHTL. 131, 156 (1990).
25 Bruchhausen in PATENTGESETZ, supra note 15, at § 9. annot., 10 in fine, 12. For a comparative
analysis, see Stauder, supra note 17, at 68. 77, 91, 107, 149; Katzenberger in KOMMENTAR, supra note 14.
at § 120 if, annot.. 83, 86.
26 Domestic manufacture for export and domestic sales to exporters have been considered acts of
infringement. See Stauder, supra note 25; Bruchhausen in PATENTGESETZ. supra note 15, at § 9. annot.,
I I: Tetzner. Verletzung deutscher Patente bei Auslandsgeschaflen. GRUR 1980. at 882; Katzenberger in
KOMMENTAR, supra note 14, at § 120 if, annot., 83, 86, 88. 35 U.S.C. § 271(0 clearly shows that such
control over foreign markets depends on supplies made "in or from" the United States; i.e., control is limited to deciding which domestic enterprise is entitled to supply foreign markets.
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ficial to the country of importation and the country of exportation. Moreover,
27
it may result in either ineffective or unwarranted protection.

Nevertheless, intellectual property such as trademarks and design tend
to protect the owner against acts of passing off. Thus, rules have recently
been devised to make exportation a specific act of infringement. These rules
undercut the principle of territoriality's basic virtue, which is to prevent
national interference with other countries' intellectual property interests and
policies. They may also lead to further development under TRIPS.
2.

The Classic Convention Principles

The real effects of the principle of territoriality may be judged only by
reference to the other principles governing international intellectual property

protection. Indeed, its importance varies considerably with the choice of the
rules governing ownership in an intellectual property right. In this respect,

the basic rule is that of nationality, which means that national territorial
28
protection is available only to nationals of the country granting protection.

27 These effects depend on the circumstances. Obviously, distortion of competition and welfare
losses to the foreign country will occur if domestic patentee A were able to prevent manufacturing and
sales on the foreign market by domestic competitor B, where there is nonexistent, or less comprehensive
or less effective protection in the foreign market. As both have to meet competition in that market, B, if
subject to A's domestic patent, would be at a disadvantage and, due to B's dissappearance from the market
or A's being awarded damages for sales lost to B on the foreign market, the foreign country will see
competition impaired against its will. However. since A cannot sell in the foreign country at "patent
prices," A should not be entitled to obtain an injunction or damages at all; i.e., A either obtains
unwarranted protection or windfall profits. Things get even worse where A and B supply the foreign
market by imports made from their common domestic country. Patent protection against such acts of
infringement by exportation will, of course, continue to harm the importing foreign country, unless B
transfers the production to the importing country, which can be done only if the foreign market is large
enough. Otherwise, the exporting country risks a welfare loss. since it is unlikely that A can take B's
former export share, either totally or at least in substantial parts. The exporting country will benefit from
its patent protection over the foreign market only if the foreign market is too small for B to move in, and if
there is no domestic competition on that market. If there is domestic competition, there is no guarantee
that A can take the full share of B's exports, since A has to meet non-patent competition. If A, with a
patent in A's own country, and B, with a patent in B's own country, but not in the third foreign country,
patent control over exports allows control even over patent-free territories (minimization of patent costs).
If,
due to international harmonization, patent protection were necessarily available on all foreign markets,
then, by relying on the domestic patent, A would be able to enjoin domestic competitor B's domestic sales,
exports, and any of B's "infringing" activites. since B will be unable to escape the patent by moving
abroad. Thus, TRIPS works against domestic and foreign competitors. That is. TRIPS works against
domestic subsidiaries of foreign enterprises serving the domestic and their home market, as well as fully
domestic enterprises. It is an exercise in world market control from the home base.
28 In addition, various non-nationals may be assimilated into nationals: e.g., expatriates (§ 122,
UrhG). foreign refugees (§ 123, UrhG), enterprises having a domestic domicile (§§ 126 I. 127 I, 128 I,
UrhG); foreigners having a domestic residence (art. L 111-5. L 614-1. III c. prop. int.).
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Clearly, in this combination, the principle of territoriality might serve to close
national markets against foreign competition. Generally, the operation of the
principle of reciprocity 29 rests on the reservation of intellectual property to
nationals. States may adhere to this principle of reciprocity for protectionist
reasons. They may also use this principle to protect their nationals in other
countries.
The principles of nationality and reciprocity have deeper roots in

copyright law. Copyright law protects the author, whereas patent law protects the invention. 30 Thus, with some exceptions, 3 1 patents are granted to
whoever applies for them by submitting a new and useful invention.
Copyright protection normally is reserved to nationals and granted to them
irrespective of where the work has been created or published. 32 The leverage
power which the principle of nationality may give in reciprocity dealings will
depend on the size of the markets each party offers to the other. For example,
the United States imposed the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act on the rest
of the world by reserving protection to nationals and offering it to foreigners
on a reciprocity basis only.33
The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, however, was a singular act
in international intellectual property relations, and certainly not one conceived
to open up foreign markets to United States citizens. 34 It was placed outside
29 See §§ 121 III, IV; 125 V; 126 III, 127 III, 128 II, UrhG; art. L 111-4: L 111-5, L 611-1,

III c.

prop. int., 17 U.S.C. § 104(b), 5. By contrast and by virtue of their very nature, moral rights will normally be granted unconditionally to foreigners as well. See 17 U.S.C. § 104(a); art. L 111-4, 2 c. prop.
int.
30 Historically, patents have been used to attract foreign inventions (as a matter of a mercantilist
policy!); for this outward-oriented character of the patent system, see David in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS,
supranote 8, at 47; Cornish, INTELL.ECTUALPROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARKS AND DESIGN
RIGHTS, § 3-010 (2d ed. 1989).
31 See art. L 611-1, 3 c. prop. int.
32 Compare §§ 120 UrhG with arts. L 111-4, L 111-5 c. prop. int., and 17 U.S.C § 104(b); but see
17 U.S.C. § 601.
33 See Dreier, National Treatment, Reciprocity and Retorsion - The Case of Computer Programs
and Integrated Circuits, in GAT OR WIPO?, supra note 2. at 63, 70; Lemberg, Semiconductor
Protection: Foreign Responses to a US Initiative, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 345, 352 (1987)
McManis, InternationalProtectionfor Semiconductor Chip Designsand the StandardofJudicialReview
of PresidentialProclamationsIssued Pursuant to the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 22
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 331, 344 (1988); for the market forces behind chip development and
chip protection, see Malerba, Demand Structure and Technological Change: The Case of the European
SemiconductorIndustry, 14 RES. POL'Y. 283 (1985); Chesser, Semiconductor Chip Protection: Changing
Rolesfor Copyright andCompetition, 71 VA. L. REv. 249, 253 (1985).
4 Rather, it was to protect a dwindling U.S. dominance of international markets. See OECD,
GLOBALsATION
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CONSTRUCTION AND SEMICONDUCTORS, 131, 137 (1992) [hereinafter GLOBALISATION . In fact, applications for protection made outside the United States and Japan have been minimal; compare with the statistics in Correa. Intellectual Property in the Field of Integrated Circuits: Implicationsfor Developing
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the general rules of international intellectual property relations and as a matter
of convention law, supersede the principle of nationality.
a.

National Treatment

The rule of national treatment is indeed the cornerstone of the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (art. 2), the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Works of Literature and the Arts (art. 5), and
the Universal Copyright Convention (art. II).35 The rule simply obliges
Member States to grant to the nationals of other Member States 36 exactly the
same substantive protection on the same conditions. Because of the large

membership to the Conventions 37 and their broad coverage, the principle of
national treatment has gained international importance. The Paris Convention
applies to all kinds of industrial property such as patents, utility models,
industrial designs, trademarks, service marks, trade names and, as a matter of
unfair competition, trade secrets 38 (art. 1). The Berne Convention extends to
all works in the field of literature, science and the arts (art. 2).
Countries, 14 WORLD COMPETITION, December 1990, at 83; Deutsches Patentamit, JAHRESBERICHT. 1992.
at 18. As between the United States and Japan, the duopolists in the market, existing problems concern
the product markets rather than intellectual property protection. See Japan- United States: Arrangement
ConcerningTrade in Semiconductor Products.31 I.L.M. 1074 (1992) and its predecessor, 25 I.L.M. 1408
(1986? See Beier. One Hundred Years ofInternational
Cooperation- The Role of the ParisConvention
in the Past, Present and Future, 15 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 1, 9 (1984); Vaver. The
National Treatment Requirements of the Berne and Universal Copyright Conventions, 17 INT'L REv.
INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 577 (1986); Katzenberger. General Principles of the Berne and the
Universal Copyright Conventions, in GATF OR WIPO? supra note 2, at 43, 45; Bodenhausen, GUIDE TO
THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 27 (1968);

Nordemann et al., INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT, art. 5, annot. 1 (1990).
36 Assimilated nationals are residents (Berne Convention, art. 3, 2) and foreign subsidiaries firmly
established in the host country. Paris Convention, art. 3; Berne Convention, art. 4(a). In addition, works
of nationals of states, which are not members of the Berne Convention, may enjoy convention status if
first published in a Member State. See Berne Convention, art. 3, I, lit. b; art. 5.
III, IV.
37 Membership to the Paris and Berne Convention is listed in INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 8 (1994),
COPYRIGHT7 (1994). At present, there are 117 Members of the Paris Convention and 105 Members of the
Berne Convention. As these conventions have been revised several times, states may adhere to different
versions of the Conventions. This article is concerned with only the most recent versions; i.e.. the Paris
Convention as revised at Stockholm 1967, and the Berne Convention as revised at Paris 1971.
38 With respect to trade secrets, though, the situation is unclear, art. 10 bis Paris Convention
obliges Member States to afford protection against unfair competition, but its illustrating examples refer to
misleading competition only. However large or small the scope of art. l h is may be, there is little doubt
that once Member States protect trade secrets, they must do so on the basis of national treatment. See
BGH of March 21, 1991, GRUR INT'L 1992, 832 - Betonsteinelemente, 23 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. &
COPYRIGHT L. 698 (1992), applying art. 2. Paris Convention, to unfair acts of imitation, rather than the
reciprocity principle of § 28, UWG; Bodenhausen, GUIDE TO TIlE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION
FORTHEPROTECTION OFINDUSTRIALPROPERTY, art. 10bis annot. d (1968).
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National treatment has to be granted to a foreign national whether
protection is sought at home or abroad. It should also be granted even if the
home State does not offer similar or equivalent protection to its own citizens
or other nationals. Moreover, national treatment does not depend on whether
the home State does offer protection at all. 39 In other words, national
treatment substitutes a rule of non-discrimination to the principle of
reciprocity. 40
Minimum Protection

b.

The requirement of reciprocity has been outlawed by the Conventions
on the basis of the minimum protection which they afford to the Member
41
States' nationals as a matter of directly applicable public international law.
The Paris Convention protects only the various subjects in a highly selective
manner. It discusses the right of priority for patents, trademarks and designs,
only to the extent of forfeiture or the grant of compulsory licenses, and to the

acquisition of trademarks. 4 2 The Berne Convention is not only more explicit
than the Universal Copyright Convention,4 3 but also contains a whole set of
44
rules defining the rights of the author and the term of copyright protection.
39 See Beier, supra note 35, at 10. This principle of non-equivalence is to be distinguished from
those intellectual property rights acquired under the Paris Convention, which remain totally national in
character and, therefore, are independent in their territorially separated existence, even if they are
acquired on the basis of the Convention. See Paris Convention. art. 4bis, art. 6: Berne Convention. art. 5,

1-2.

40 Beier, supranote 35, at 9.
41 The extent to which the provisions of the Convention, once ratified by a Member State, are selfexecuting (individuals may rely on them before national courts) is largely a question of national constitutional law. Thus, answers vary from country to country and from provision to provision. See
Bodenhausen, supra note 38, at 13; Ullmann in PATENTGEsETZ, supra note 15, at Int'l Teil. annot. 10:
Katzenberger in KOMMENTAR, supra note 14, at § 120 if, annot. 63.
42 For trademarks, the next most important provisions are the telle quelle protection afforded by art.
6quinquies and the protection granted for well-known marks (art. 6 bis, Paris Convention). Other rules
relate to the inventor's right to be mentioned as such in the patent (art. 4ter), to the extension of product
protection by process katents to imported products (art. 5quater); to the exemption from protection of inventions embodied in vessels, aircraft, or land vehicles (art. 5 ter); to the exclusion of official symbols from
trademark protection (art. 6 ter).
43 This Convention may have headed toward obsolescence since the United States joined the Berne
Convention (see Additional Declaration in sub. (c) to art. XVII. Universal Copyright Convention) and
since the latter has been incorporated into TRIPS (art. 9).
44 It is virtually a master copy of a traditional copyright legislation providing for moral rights (art.
6bis); the term of copyright protection for various kinds of works (art. 7); a detailed catalogue of the
author's privileges of translation (art. 8); adaptation (art. 12, 14); reproduction (art. 9), including its exemptions (art. 9, II: fair use; art. 10: citation right); public performance and transmission (art. 11); the
.
droit de suite (art. 14 ter) A main principle of the Berne Convention (as distinguished from art. Ii.
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However, its focus is on the protection of traditional works of literature and
the arts, and their forms of exploitation. Its focus is not on modem ways of
exploitation,4 5 technological works like computer programs, 46 or databases
47

and software generated works.
The great Conventions do not generally approach the matters of
remedies for infringement or enforcement. 48 The Paris Convention, though
relating to subject matter that does obtain protection only upon a specific
grant, does treat the granting procedure as a matter of purely national concem.49 More importantly, although the Conventions do provide for some
form of dispute settlement by arbitration,5 0 compliance with convention rules
largely is dependent on Member States' self-interest. The question of
whether the subject matter qualifies for Convention status and triggers its
international protection is an issue to be determined by the individual Member

Universal Copyright Convention) is that it expressly makes copyright protection independent from any
formal requirements, registration, or copyright notice. See art. 5. (2); art. 15. This corresponds to the
continental copyright tradition and constituted an obstacle (together with the protection of moral rights) to
the United States' joining the Berne Convention until their own TRIPS Initiative indirectly forced them to
change their mind. See Baumgartner & Meyer, Die Bedeutung des Beitrilts der USA zur Berner
Obereinkunfl, GRUR INT'L, 1989, at 620: Dietz. Die USA und das "Droit Moral": Idiosynkrasie oder
Annaherung, GRUR INT'L, 1989, at 627.
45 Such as the so-called neighboring rights of performing artists, phonogram producers, or radio
and television broadcasters, which are covered by a specific, but not generally adhered to, "Convention for
the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations" concluded in
Rome on October 26, 1961.
46 Whether computer programs constitute literary works and, therefore, are eo ipso covered by the
Berne Convention, whether they enjoy its protection only once Member States protect them as literary
works, or whether they cannot be brought under the Convention at all is a highly controversial matter.
See Vaver, supra note 35, at 602; Dreier, supra note 33, in GAT' OR WIPO?, supra note 2, at 67:
Cornish, Computer Program Copyright and the Berne Convention (1990), 4 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.
129; Soltysinski, Protection of Computer Programs: Comparative and InternationalAspects. 21 INT'L
REv. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIoHT L. 1, 25 (1990).
47 Cf.Reichman, ElectronicInformation Tools - The Outer Edge of World Intellectual Property
Law, 24 INT'LREV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIoHTL. 447 (1993).
48 Some provisions are made in Paris Convention, art. 9, 1 0ter; Berne Convention, arts. 15-16.
49 See Paris Convention, art. 2. 3, 6, 12.
50 See Paris Convention, art. 28; Berne Convention, art. 33. Although the majority of Member
States have accepted arbitration, this has not become practical due to the broad discretion Member States
enjoy in implementing the Convention rules. More importantly, any sanction Member States may impose
for violation of the Paris or the Berne Convention by another Member State (see Kunz-Hallstein, The
US.-Proposal for a GAT-Agreement on Intellectual Property and the Paris Convention for the
Protection ofIndustrial Property, in GATT OR WIPO?, 75, 87, reprintedin 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
265 (1989)), will be negative in its effect; e.g.. reprisals or withdrawal from the Convention. What is
needed is to bring the Member State back to meeting its obligation by means of some positive incentive.
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States. 5 1 Thus, Member States determine what private individuals may obtain
as international protection though private litigation before national courts.
c.

Non-Interference

The international extension of national intellectual property protection
was based on a principle of mutual non-interference with matters of national
intellectual property policy.

It was based on the respect of intellectual

property as a matter of national public policy. 52 Member States felt free to
grant protection to foreigners and could generally do so since, due to
territoriality and minimum protection, they remained independent of the
formulation of the exclusivity they granted. The basis of this form of a quid
pro quo was that Member States conceived of their territories as national
markets in the intellectual property regime. This conception fits the cornpetitive standing and needs of their own industry, but not necessarily that of
the foreigners they invited or accepted. As 53a result, the intellectual property
systems developed in widely differing ways.
The concept of patentable invention varies as to subject matter, the
criteria of patentability, 54 the term of the patent, 55 the scope of protection it
51 That is certainly true for the concept of what constitutes an invention under Paris Convention,
art. 1, with Member States applying rather different definitions (excluding pharmaceuticals, computer
software, etc.). See Bodenhausen. supra note 38, art. 1, (2), annot. c. Similarly, the notion of literary
work used by Berne Convention, art. 2, leaves Member States with enough latitude to include or exclude
computer programs. See supra note 46; Katzenberger, GeneralPrinciplesof the Berne and the Universal
Copyright Convention, in GATT OR WIPO?. supra note 2. at 43, 46; Nordemann, Dos Prinzip der
lnlinderbehandlungund der Begriffder "Werke der Literaturund Kunst, " GRUR INT'L, 1989, 615.
52 See Beier, supra note 35, at 8; Dhanjee, Boisson de Chazournes, Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS): Objectives,Approaches and Basic Principlesof the GA Ti and of
Intellectual Property Conventions, 24 J.WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1990, at 5, 7; Reichman, Intellectual
Property in International Trade: Opportunities and Risks of a GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'LL. 747, 844 (1989).
53 For an overview, see IPO, Existence, Scope and Form of Generally InternationallvAccepted
andApplied Standards/Normsfor the ProtectionofIntellectualProperty, in GATT OR WIPO?, supra note
2, at 213; Zaphiriou, Transnational Technology Protection, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 879, 885 (1992):
Stanberry, Forging a New International Frontier in Intellectual Property. 13 WORLD COMPETITION,
March 1990, at 105, 113.

54 Regarding the notion of a patentable invention, it was only in 1968, that Germany allowed
patents for chemical compounds. Other countries followed even later (Italy, 1979; Spain, only when
obliged to do so by the Treat of Accession to the E.E.C.). Computer software is non-patentable under
European Patent Convention, art. 52, (2). lit. c, (3). For the various exclusions from patentability, see
WIPO, InternationallyAccepted Standards,in GATT OR WIPO?, supranote 2. at 299. Countries define
the novelty criterion in accordance with their own needs; for example, they limit disclosure by prior use
to use in the domestic territory (see 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) as compared with European Patent Convention,
art. 54, (2)), or grant a grace period (see German Utility Model Law § 3. 1-2).
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affords, 56 the exceptions to which it is subject,57 and the issue of compulsory

licenses. 5 8 Similarly, in some countries patents co-exist with utility models of
various kinds, 59 while in other countries the patent system holds a legislative
monopoly.60 Patents may be granted upon examination only, upon mere
registration, by some mixed granting procedure 6' to the true and first
inventor, 62 or simply to the first applicant.
55 Ranging from five to twenty years, generally, the term begins to run from the date the application
is made, but in some countries only from the date the patent is granted, (e.g. 35 U.S.C. § 154). For an
overview, see WIPO, InternationallyAccepted Standards,in GATT OR WIPO?, supra note 2, at 309.
56 Thus, the determination and interpretation of the patent claims have been controversial issues
among the Member States of the European Patent Convention. See Bruchhausen, Deterntining Patent
Subject-matter in Grant, Infringement and Revocation Proceedings. 20 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. &
CoPYR.IGHT L. 341 (1989), and the companion articles by Falconer, 20 INT'L REv. INDUS. PROP. &
COPYRIGHT L. 348 (1989) and Le Tallec, 20 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 355 (1989):
Brinkhof, Some Thoughts on Equivalents.22 INT'LREV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIOHTL. 908 (1991)). It is
also controversial at the international level. See Bardehle, Einbeziehung der Aquivalenzlehre in den
IWJPO-Patentharmonisierungsvertrag,
Mitt. Pat. Anw.. 1992, 133. Although the issue appears to be one
of legal niceties, it is a fundamental one in economic terms. See Merges & Nelson. supra note 9.
57 For example, what constitutes permissible experimental use may be appraised differently under
German Patent Act § 11 and under 35 U.S.C. § 271. For a comparative analysis, see Chrocziel, DIE
BENUTZUNG PATENTIERTER ERFINDUNGEN ZU VERSUCHS- tIND FORSCHUNGSZWECKEN 10, 148 (1986):

Bruzzone, The Research Exemption: A Proposal,21 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N. Q. J. 53 (1993).
58 For a survey, see Planner, Compulsory Licensing of Patents: Survey and Recent Trends, NIR
1985, at 1,reprintedin GRUR INT'L, 1985, 357; WVIPO, InternationallyAccepted Standards,in GATT OR
WIPO?, supra note 2. at 224.
59 For Germany or Japan, see Htlusser, Utility Models: The Experience of the FederalRepublic of
Germany, INDUS. PROP., 1987, at 314; Steup, Unorthodoxe Gedanken zun Gebrauchsnusterrecht,GRUR.
1990, at 800. Approximately fifteen States provide for one form of utility model protection or another.
This form of protection depends on the accessibility of patent protection. Mere registration and low cost
patents leave little room for utility models.
60 However, the positions are about to change. For the United Kingdom, see Lees, A Light in the
Twilight Zone? ProposedProtectionfor "Sub-Patentable" Inventions, PAT. WORLD. Nov. 30, 1993:
contra Hodkinson, Quest, FurtherReforn ofthe Patent Laws? The Case Against Petty Patents, 4 EUR.
INTELL PROP. REv. 108 (1985).

61 For general information on the various systems, see WIPO, InternationallyAccepted Standards.
in GATT OR WIPO?, supra note 2, at 219; HANDBUCH GEWERBLICHE SCHUTIZRECHTE - OBERSICHTEN UND
STRATEGIEN 46, 133 (1993).

62 The only major industrial country following the first-to-invent rather than the first-to-file system
for the grant of patents is the United States. Compare 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 115, 135 with § 7, PaIG.
Original expectations that the system would be changed following WIPO negotiations over harmonization
of the world patent system have dwindled away during these WIPO negotiations. See Schtfers &
Schennen, Der erste Teil der Diplomatischen Konferenz zunt Abschluss eines Vertrages zur
Harmnonisierungdes Patentrechts,GRUR INT'L, 1991, at 849; Fiorito, The WIPO "BasicProposal" For
Hanonizationof Patent Lais Viewed From the US Practitioners'Point of View, 19 AM. INTELL. PROP.
L. Assoc. J. 24, 35 (1991); Pagenberg, DiplomaticConference in the Hague on Harmonization of Patent
Law, 22 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 682 (1991). Once the MTO-Agreement had been
reached, President Clinton was quick to announce that the first-to-invent system will be maintained,

including one ofits major drawbacks, which is non-disclosure ofthe invention before the grant (35 U.S.C.
§ 122). See U.S. Says Not Now on First-to-File and Agrees with Japan on Patent Tern, 47 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 285 (1994). However, TRIPS, art. 27, (1). does oblige the United
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The fortunate patentee may have to face patenting and maintenance
costs which are different from country to country as to the amount and the
mode of calculation. 63 The satisfaction the patentee will obtain in case of
64
infringement will likewise vary largely even among industrialized countries.

In some countries, the patentee may obtain an injunction, possibly even in
summary proceedings, while in others not. 65 These differences are important
for the patentee's competitor. The competitor may or may not be allowed by
national law to raise an invalidity defense in infringement procedures, 66 or
rely on a right of prior use. 67 The competitor may be held to a no challenge
clause 68 or may object on grounds of patent or of copyright misuse. These
differences are well known in the United States, 69 but are little known
elsewhere.

States to recognize the priority of inventions made abroad (contrary to 35 U.S.C. § 102(g). See Fiorito, id.
at 37.
63 The most important distinction is that between lump sum fees and progressive maintenance fees.
For a general discussion on fees, see Rebel, supra note 61, at 39; for a comparison of U.S. and European
patent costs, see Armitage, Updating the European Patent Convention, 22 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. &
COPYRIGHTL. 1, 2 (1991).
64 For
copyright,
see
Graffenried,
VERMOGENSRECHTLICHE
ANSPROCHE
BEI
URHEBERRECHTSVERLETZUNGEN - EINE RECHTVERGLEICHENDE DARSTELLUNG NACH DEUTSCHEM,
OTERREICHISCHEM, FRANZOSISCHEM. AMERIKANISCHEM UND SCHWEIZERISCHEM RECHT (1993). For a

comparison of the U.S. and German law of intellectual property, see Pagenberg, Die Amerikanische
Schadensersatzpraxisim Gewerblichen Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht,GRUR INT'L. 1980, 286.
65 See WIPO, InternationallyAccepted Standards, m GATr OR WIPO?, supra note 2, at 226;
Stauder, The PracticalSignificance ofInfringemient and Revocation Proceedingsin the Federal Republic
of Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom - Results of a Statisticaland EmpiricalStudy, 14
INT'L REv. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 793 (1983). In recent years, however, national legislatures
have generally tended to reinforce protection by providing for injunctive relief against infringement.
96 Compare Mangini, The Legal Framework for Infringement and Revocation Proceedings in
PatentMattersin the ContractingStates of the European Patent Convention, 14 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP.
& COPYRIGHTL. 776 (1983) with Stauder, supra note 17, at 797. For the Community Patent, see Foglia.
Procedural Aspects of Litigation Relating to Community Patents, 22 INT'L REv. INDUS. PROP. &
COPYRIGHTL. 970 (1991).
67 See § 12, PatG; WIPO, Generally Accepted Standards, in GATT OR WIPO?, supra note 2, at
303. The prior use issue is substantial enough to withstand compromise within the EC. See Neukom, A
PriorUse Rightfor the Community PatentConvention, 5 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 165 (1990).
68 Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969); Dreyfiss, Dethroning Lear: Licensing Estoppel and the
Incentive to Innovate, 72 VAND. L. REV. 677 (1986); for analysis of European and German laws, see v.
Maltzahn,

ZUR

RECHTLICHEN

BEURTEILUNG

VON

NICHTANGRIFFSABREDEN

OBER

TECHNISCHE

ScHUrzREcHTE 597 (1990).
69 For a comparative analysis, see Mangini. Erfahrungenmit dein Begriff des Patentmissbrauchsin
Nordamerika und Europa, GRUR INT'L, 1985, 787; for the United States, see Takenaka, Extending the
New PatentMisuse Limitation to Copyright: LasercombAmerica Inc. v. Reynolds, 5 SOFTWARE L. J. 739
(1992).
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ProtectingIntellectualPropertyInternationally

As a result of the development of Classic Convention Principles, international enterprises had to develop individual intellectual property policies
and strategies. These policies and strategies were not a mere alternative to
patenting or secrecy. 70

They also took into account the purely territorial

effect of protection, the strength which a patent that has been examined
thoroughly in one country will have in other countries operating merely a
registration system, the scope of protection a patent will enjoy in a given
72
country, 7 1 and the effectiveness and cost of infringement litigation.
Selection of any particular strategy would depend on the costs of patent
protection, the necessity to protect an entire technology by several patents
rather than a product by a single patent, 73 the different interests the enterprise
has in its major or minor markets, and the differing mobility of competitors.
Selective strategies of filing, maintaining, and enforcing national patents
generally aim to defeat the competing would-be infringer either directly in his
home market 74 or in some of his major supply markets. Such intellectual
70 For this classic alternative, see Grefermann, ROTHLINGSHOFER, PATENTWESEN UND TECHNISCHER
FORTSCHRITT TEIL II: PATENT- UND LIZENZPOLITIK DER UNTERNEHMEN 32 (1974); Oppenlainder, Patent
Policies and Technical Progress in the Federal Republic of Germany, 8 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. &
COPYRIGHT L. 97, 106 (1977); EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION,
IMPLICATIONS FOR R AND D OF CURRENT TRENDS ININDUSTRIAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 10 (1988)
[hereinafter EIRMA].
71 See supra note 56. This is an issue that economists approach quite differently than lawyers, who
tend to grant broad protection for important and pioneering inventions. See Ullmann in PATENTGESETZ,
supra note 15, at § 14, annoL 8; Welte, DER SCHTrz VON PIONIERERFINDUNGEN 128 (1991) (with comparative law aspects). For an economic analysis, see David in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 8, at 37:
Merges & Nelson, supra note 9, passim; Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulder of Giants: Cumulative
Research andthe PatentLaw, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (1991).
72 See Rebel, supra note 61, at 31; Shapiro, Responding to the ChangingPatentSystem, RES. TECit.
MGMT., Sept.-Oct. 1990. at 38; Berkovitz, Getting the Mostfrom Your Patent,RES. TECH. MGMT.. Mar.Apr. 1993, at 26; Sinnot, PharmaceuticalIP Portfolios,MANAGING INTELL PROP., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 20:
Krukiel, Foreign Patenting Strategies of InternationalCorporations, 13 INTELL PROP. ASIA PAC. 17
(1986); EIRMA, supra note 70, at 9; Bertin, Patent and Licensing Strategiesof the Various Technology
Types of Corporations, in RESULTS AND METHODS, supra note 8, at 83; Bertin & WyatL
MULTINATIONALES ET PROPRIE.TI INDUSTRIELLE - LE CONTR6LE DE LA TECHNOLOGIE MONDIALE 67 (1986).

73 In general only pharmaceuticals will present examples of the one product-one patent situation.
This contributes to the industry's high propensity to patent, as evidenced by patent statistics. See
EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT, 1993, 38, 77; OECD, supra note 34, at 61, 77.

74 For the U.S.-Japan patent dispute, see Wineberg, The JapanesePatent System: A Non-Tariff
Barrierto Foreign Business? 22 J. WORLD TRADE.L., February 1988, at 1I; Note: PatentProtection in
Japan, 15 EAST ASIAN ExacurivE REP. 6 (Nov. 1993) and 9 (Dec. 1993); for a Japanese view, see the
statements by Uchida, Oiwa, Rahn, Nakayama in AIPPJ Journal, (Dec. 1988); for the settlement of the
dispute by a bilateral understanding on patent filing procedure and the U.S. patent term, see U.S. Says
"Not Now" on First-to-Fileand Agrees with Japan on Patent Tern, 47 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J.
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property policies cannot be the same for patents, trademarks, 75 or copyright.
While the policies for patents and trademarks are heavily influenced by
considerations of cost 76 and granting procedures, policies for the protection of
copyright, which arise automatically with the creation of the work and at no
cost, have to account for the imperfections inherent in such protection. 77
All such policies are formulated in terms of the respective interests and
strengths of the owner of the right and of competitors. They may be
combined optimally to protect a mix of patents, trademarks, trade secrets, and
copyright. 78 Moreover, the availability of international protection has been
increasingly facilitated by the establishment of organizations for the central
grant of patents and trademarks on the global and regional levels. These
include the Patent Cooperation Treaty, 79 the European and African Patent or
(BNA) 285 (1994); U.S.-Japan Conclude Agreement on Reexamination and Publication, 48 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 412 (1994)
75 International trademark protection must take cultural differences (language, symbol understanding) into account. It may not coexist with the loopholes, such as the risk of trademark appropriation by
others. At the same time, risks of conflicts with prior rights (marks names, designs ets.) are enormous
with respect to the latter problem, and with a comparative law-analysis made in view of the Community
Trademark. See v. Milhlendahl. Unitary Characterand Problems of Coexistence in the FutureEuropean
TrademarkSystem, 7 INT'LREV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHTL. 173 (1976).
76 See Rebel, supra note 61, at 39: Armitage. supra note 63; Hodkinson, The Management of
IntellectualPropertyRights, in TECHNOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT 41, 47 (Wild. ed., 1990).
77 The main problems are non-protection of ideas (which actually constitute the value of a computer
program and frequently also of databases) and uncertainty of the actual scope of protection (non-existence
of examined claims; establishment of privately run registration systems). As a result, copyright protection
is effective only when combined with secrecy (distribution of computer program in object code only, use of
program locks etc.). See, e.g., Lahore, Intellectual PropertyRights and Unfair Copying: Old concepts,
New Ideas, 12 EUR. INTELL PROP. REV. 428, 480 (1992); Pollack, The GordianAlgorithm: An Attempt to
Untangle the InternationalDilemmna Over the Protection of Computer Software. 22 LAW & POLVY INT'L
Bus. 815 (1991); see also infra note 141.
78 Combination of patent protection for inventions and trade secret protection for accompanying
know-how is well known. See Bleeke & Rahl, The Value of Territorial and Field-of-Use Restrictions in
the InternationalLicensing of Unpatented Know how: An Empirical Study, I NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
450, 455 (1979). Also well known are the reinforcement and factual prolongation of protection for new
(patented) articles by trademarks. For copyright and trade secret-combination, see supra note 77. The
admissibility of cumulative protection is controversial as a matter of intellectual property principles and of
the preemption doctrine in the U.S. See Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson, 996 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1993),
27 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1014, 1016; Computer Associates Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2nd Cir.
1992), 23 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1241, 1260. For comparative analysis, see Ullrich. in SOFTWAREVERTRAO,
supra note 17. at Teil I, Kap. I, § 41B2.
9 For a good introduction, see WIPO, The Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)and Its Importance to
Developing Countries, 3 INTELL PROP. AsIAPAc. 45 (1993); Rebel, supra note 61, at 149. Basically, the
PCT centralizes the application procedure (not the granting procedure) for international patent
applications by giving national applications to Member States, which comply with the formal
requirements for the status of an international application that qualifies as a national application in all the
other Member States, and by providing for a centralized novelty search by certain authorized patent
offices or institutions. The PCT also allows for a preliminary examination of the patent application
(which is important for countries that do not have these facilities). A more important aspect is that it
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Intellectual Property Organizations,8 0 and the Madrid Agreement Concerning
the International Registration of Trademarks and its Protocol of 1989.81
However, these arrangements, though paving the way for a deliberate strategy
of international protection at least for larger enterprises able to handle all the
procedures, have not eased the major constraint put on these strategies, such
as the differences of national intellectual protection or non-protection. They
oblige enterprises to adapt their strategies to the public policies governing
intellectual property in the respective host countries. The importance of this
constraint is obvious. National intellectual property policies reflect a state's
attitude vis-iL-vis the interrelationship of competition and innovation in

marking the dividing line between innovation and imitation,8 2 and in
promoting innovation by intellectual property incentives, rather than by direct
intervention into the market.83 However, different national intellectual
property regimes mean different competition policies. As a result, in
formulating their intellectual property strategies, international enterprises may
not follow competitive necessities as they see them. Rather, they must
compromise with a different and competing national competition/intellectual
property policies.
B.

Trade Related HarmonizationofNationalIntellectualProperty

Both the Paris and the Berne Conventions invite Member States to hold
revision conferences, 'kWith a view to the introduction of amendments
designed to improve the system of the Union" (art. 18 Paris Convention, art.
27 Berne Convention). Several such conferences have been held in the first
practically permits the examination (not disclosure) to be postponed for twenty months following the
priority date. This results from the fact that the applicant has twenty months to file what is now an
international application with the patent offices of the designated countries, and that during this period a
designated office may not take any action. Thus, the applicant enjoys an additional period of time for
evaluating the patentability (and the commercial value!) of the invention in those countries that do not
allow for deferred examination (e.g. EPO as compared to DPA).
80 For an overview, see Zaphiriou, supra note 53, at 887.
81 See Samuels, The U.S.-Perspective on the Madrid Protocol, 11 EUR. INTELL PROP. R. 418
(1993). (with text of the Protocol annexed); Cornish, The Madrid Agreement for the International
Registration of Trade Marks: A UnitedKingdom Perspective, 22 INT'LREV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT
L. 779 (1991); Beier & Kur. Deutschlandund dasMadriderMarkenabkommen, GRUR INT'L, 1991 at 67.
82 See David in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 8, at 24; Ullrich, Die wettbewerbspolitische
Behandlung gewerblicherSchutzrechte in der EWG, GRUR INT'L, 1984. 89.
83 See Stedman, Invention and Public Policy, 12 LAW & CONTEMPOR. PROBS. 649, 669 (1947);
Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the PatentMonolpoy: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J.
267, 269. 273 (1966); see also Ullrich, PRIVATRECHTSFRAGEN DER FORSCHUNGFORDERUNG IN DER
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 22 (1984) [hereinafler PRIVATRECHTSFRAOENJ; Ullrich, EUROPEAN
STANDARDS OF PATENTABILITY 108 (1977).
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half of this century. All have resulted in a strengthening of international
intellectual property protection, however modest. 84 However, with the
emergence of developing countries, revision conferences took a turn toward
granting these countries specific concessions in the form of exceptions from
the minimum rights they had to guarantee. As such, minimum reciprocity was
replaced by a preferential status. 85 Additionally, the revision conferences
liberalized the conditions governing the admissibility of limitations that
Member States may place on the exercise of an exclusive right. In particular,
they strengthened developing countries' power to grant compulsory licenses
86
on foreign-held intellectual property.

National differences in international intellectual property protection
were bound to widen. However, economic development trends of the 1960s
and 1970s were replaced by those of the 1980s. This movement toward preferred treatment was superseded by a renewed interest in reinforced
international intellectual property protection. The aim was broad and strong
protection. This was to be achieved by moving from non-reciprocity based
on minimum protection to full reciprocity disguised as harmonization on an
adequate level of effective protection. 87 It was also achieved by moving from
the legal experts arena of WIPO to the GATT-forum where it is traded, for
better or for worse, 88 as an economic concession for access to and control
over markets. Consequently, bargains are made binding not by the cast of

votes, 89 but by the exercise of leverage power.
84 With respect to the Paris Convention, see Beier, supra note 35. at 3. 14; with respect to the Berne
Convention, see Nordemann, supra note 51, at Introduction, annots. 1, 41.
85 Compare this with the Berne Convention annex, 'Developing Countries." made in Paris in 1971;
see Ulmer, The Revisions of the Copyright Conventions, 2 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 345
(1971); Ulmer, The Revision of the Copyright Conventions in the Light of the Washington
Recommendation, 2 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRiGHTL. 235 (1970).
86 Kunz-Hallstein, Die Genfer Konferenz zur Revision der Pariser Verbandsflbereinkunfl zun
Schutz des geiverblichen Eigentunts, GRUR INT'L, 1981, 137; Kunz-Hallstein, Verscharfer Ausabungszwang fir Patente? Oberlegungen zur geplanten Revision des art. 5 A PVO, GRUR INT'L, 1981. 347;
Kunz-Hallstein, Die Ergebnisse der Konferenz von Nairobi zur Revision der Pariser Verbandsabereinkunfl - Entwurf einer Neufassung des art. 5 A PV(l, GRUR INT'L. 1982, 45; note: Vierte
Sitzung der Diplomatischen Konferenz zur Revision der PVC1,
GRUR INI,T'L 1984. 317: Stoll, supra note
2, at 235, 255.
87 For the 'cffective and adequate Protection" formula, see The "Ministerial Declaration on The
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations" of September 20 1986, reprinted in 25 INT'L LEG.
MAT. 1623, 1626 (1986), and the Preamble of the TRIPS Agreement. As to the more basic reasons for
this reversal of tide, see TRIPS Agreement, arts. III A, IV.
88 See Ullrich in GATT OR WIPO?. supra note 2, at 135.
89 The rules of unanimity and one country-one vote, which govern international diplomatic agreements, were a major reason behind the attempts to revise the Paris Convention. Under these rules, every
Member State had a sort of a veto right to block all progress, while the majority rule would favor decisions
by the number rather than by the importance of countries. The risk was the poor majority expropriated
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Adequate Protection
With respect to technological property, 90 the TRIPS-Agreement

obliges Member States to harmonize their patent, trade secret, and software
copyright law on a level of adequate protection by 1) incorporating the relevant provisions of the Paris Convention (art. 2)9 1 into TRIPS and, 2) by
setting forth a number of principles for the grant and the scope of technological property which, if combined with the incorporated rules of the Paris
Convention, establish a full and comprehensive system of protection. Thus,
Member States shall grant patent protection "for any inventions, whether
products or processes, in all fields of technology" with the exception of
inventions running afoul of public order or morality. 92 This definition leaves
the rich minority. See Ballreich & Kunz-Hallstein, Revision of the ParisConvention: The Principleof
Unanimity, 9 INT'LREV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHTL. 21 (1978).
90 For a survey of the TRIPS rules relating to copyright, see Correa. supra note 34, at 543;
Uchtenhagen.

DIE GATT-VERHANDLUNGEN

OBER URHEBER-

UND LEISTUNGSSCHUTZ.

433 (1990);

Reinbothe, Der Schutz des Urheberrechts und der Leistungsschutzrechie hi Abkonnmncnsentwurf
GATTTRIPS, GRUR INT'L, 1992, at 707; Reichman, The TRIPS Component of the GATT's Uruguay
Round-Competitive Prospects for Intellectual Property Owners in an Integrated World Market, 4
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA& ENT. L.J. 171, 216 (1993).
91 GATT TRIPS, art. 2 incorporates arts. 1-12 and art. 19 of the Paris Convention: art. 1,
definition of industrial property; art. 2, national treatment; art. 4. priority right; art. 4 bis , independence of
national rights; art. 4 ter right of the inventor to be named as such: art. 4quater, no refusal of patent grant
on the ground that the distribution of patented articles may be restricted by law; art. 5A, forfeiture and
compulsory licences; art. 5 bis, a grace period for the payment of fees; art. 5 ter, patented devices forming
part of vessels, aircraft, or land vehicles; art. 5quater , protection in the importing countries of products
resulting from a patented process; art. 10 bis, trade secret protection by the law of unfair competition (but
see supra n. 38); art. 1I. temporary protection at certain international exhibitions; art. 12. duty of Member
States to establish a special industrial property service with a central office; art. 19, freedom of contracting
parties to enter into special, more favorable agreements. Many of these Paris Convention rules are
superseded by TRIPS rules, the most obvious examples of which are the Paris Convention, art. 2, I, by
GATT TRIPS, art. 3 (national treatment); Paris Convention, art. 2, III, by the GAT TRIPS rules on
enforcement; Paris Convention, art. 5A, by GATT TRIPS, art. 31 (compulsory licenses); Paris
Convention, art. 1 0b is , by GATT TRIPS. art. 39 (trade secrets); Paris Convention, art. 19, by GATT
TRIPS, art. 4 (most favored nation treatment), whose principle is co-existence and complementary
application for enhanced intellectual property protection.
92 Included in the exemptions Contracting Parties may make are measures to protect human,
animal, plant life or health, or to avoid serious harm to the environment, provided that such exclusion
from patentability is not made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by domestic law. It should be
noted that industrialized countries generally have construed such exemptions narrowly so that only
inventions, which do not serve any purpose and are contrary to the public order are excluded from
patentability.
See Straus, Ethische, rechtliche und wirtschaftliche Probleme des Patent- und
Sortenschuzes fr die biotechnologische Tierzachtung und Tierproduktion. GRUR INT'L 1990, at 913.
917; Moufang, Patentabilityof Genetic Inventions in Aninals, 20 INT'L REv. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT
L. 823, 843 (1989); Moufang. GENETISCHE ERFINDUNGEN IMGEWERBLICHEN RECHTSSCHUTz 219 (1988).
Typically, ethical considerations have remained conspicuously absent from patentability discussions even
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room for an interpretation of what constitutes an invention, notably whether
computer programs may be considered inventions. 93 However, this definition
of patentable subject matter gives a maximalist answer to some important
patent policy questions, such as whether chemical compounds in certain
pharmaceuticals 94 should be protected, or whether states may exempt certain
politically sensitive areas of technology from patent monopolies like
agriculture and foodstuffs. The only exception TRIPS allows is for
diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical methods, 95 and for plants, 96 animals, and
essentially biological processes. 97 Therefore, the scope of available patent

protection is as broad as in the most advanced industrialized countries.
Genetic engineering inventions are the only issues left open, as industrialized
in biotechnology up until the patent application for the oncogene-mouse began to raise political resistance.
See Jaenichen & Schrell, The "Harvard Onco-mouse" in the Opposition Proceedings before the
European Patent Office, 9 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 345 (1993); Moufang, Patentierungmenschlicher
Gene, Zellen und Korperteile- Zur ethischen Dimension des Patentrechis,GRUR INT'L, 1993, at 439.
93 Under U.S. patent law, patentability of computer programs has always hinged on the question
whether the programs represent merely mental steps or mathematical formula, rather then useful technical
teachings. Continental patent laws generally provide for an express exclusion of computer programs as
such. See art. 52. 11, lit. c, EPC. The issue is whether the exclusion is of general character or is only a
result of that program; algorithms are only mental steps or mathematical formula. For an international
comparison, see Ullrich in SOFTWAREVERTRAG, supra note 17, at Teil 1, Kap. 1. § 2.
4 See Challu, The Consequences of PharmaceuticalProduct Patenting, 15 WORLD COMPETITON,
December 1991, at 65; Rozek, The Consequences of PharmaceuticalProduct Patenting: A Critique, 16
WORLD COMPETITON, March 1993, at 91; Nogus, Patents and PharmaceuticalDrugs: Understanding
the Pressures on Developing Countries,24 J.WORLD TRADE, December 1990, at 81. Non-patentability of
pharmaceuticals in Brazil and Mexico was the reason for retaliatory action by the United States and for
including intellectual property provisions in the NAFTA Agreement. For Brazil, see Ullrich in GATT OR
WIPO?, supra note 2, at 150; for Mexico, see NAFTA, art. 1709. j (1), (4). reprinted in 32 INT'L LEG.
MAT. 605, 673 (1993); Bale Jr., A Positive View ofNAFTA. LES NOUVELLES 21 (1993); Gonzales, An
Analysis of the Legal Implications of the Intellectual Properly Provisions of the North American Free
Trade Agreements, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 305 (1993). Similarly, countries joining the EC must subscribe to
an obligation to patent pharmaceuticals as a matter of joining the European Patent Convention. For
Spain. see Treaty ofAccession: Protocol No. 8, OJEC 1985, 1, 424; Gomez & Segade. Grundzoge und
Einzelheiten des Spanischen Patentgesetzes GRUR INT'L, 1988. 99. For the diversity existing in patent
protection for pharmaceuticals, see PharmaceuticalIP Portfolios, MANAGING INTELL. PROP., Jan.-Feb.
1994, at 20
95 Normally, this exclusion is read narrowly, however. For diagnostic methods, see BGH of January
19. 1984. GRUR 1985, 278; for therapeutic methods. see BGH of January 20, 1977, 9 INT'L REV. INDUS.
PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 42 (1978) - Benzene sulfonyl urea; BPatG of December 12, 1983, GRUR 1985,
276 - Schichtkerato-plastiktransplantat.
96 However, according to GAIT TRIPS, art. 28. III, lit b, Member States must provide for plant
variety protection by patents (as do the United States: 35 U.S.C. § 161), by "an effective sui generis system" (as do European Countries), or by any combination thereof. For an overview, see Moufang,
Protection of Plant Breeding and Plant Varieties-A Frontierof PatentLaw. 23 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP.
& COPYRIGHT L. 328 (1992); Straus. Die Diplonatische Konferenz zur Revision des Internationalen
Obereinkomnenszumn Schutz von Pflanzenzachtungen, GRUR INT'L, 1991, 507.
97 According to GATT TRIPS, art. 27, II. lit. b. and to international practice, however, patent
protection must be available for microorganisms and microbiological processes.
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98
countries themselves have not yet fully decided on the proper policy.
Similarly, by requiring inventions to be new and to involve an inventive step,
the level of patentability has been raised to the standards which all
industrialized countries have adopted over the last decades, 99 just as the
disclosure requirement has been phrased in their terms. 100
The breadth of available protection is matched by the scope of the
exclusivity a patent must afford its owner. Making, using, offering for sale,
or importing patented products or products directly resulting from a patented
process, may not be used by third parties in the first place (art. 28). The real
importance of this definition of the rights conferred by a patent 10 is that the
Member States may place strict limitations on these rights. This is true for
the general exception in favor of such privileged use as it is for private or
experimental use (art. 39). It is particularly true for the specific exceptions
which Member States may provide for compulsory licenses. This Achilles'
heel of patent protection, which developing countries had attacked under the
Paris Convention, has now been protected by no less than eight prerequisites
limiting the grant as a matter of substantive law,' 0 2 and two procedural
prerequisites (art. 31). Thus, such licenses may not be granted by simple
operation of the law as statutory licenses, but only by specific decisions taken

98 For the problem of essentially biological processes (other than microbiological processes) and of
genetic engineering, see Moufang, supra note 96, at 823; Straus, supra note 96, at 213; Correa, The
Pharmaceutical Industry and Biotechnology-Opportunities and Constraintsfor Developing Countries, 15
WORLD COMPETITION 43 (No.2, 1992); Fuller, Intellectual Property Rights Associated With
Biotechnologv-An International Trade Perspective, INT'L TRADE. Q.J. 529 (1988-89); Yusing Ko. An
Economic Analysis of Biotechnology Patent Protection, 102 YALE L.J. 777 (1992); Acharya, Patenting of
Biotechnology-GA 7T and the Erosion of the World's Biodiversity, 25 J. WORLD. TRADE L., December
1991. at71.
99 Up to the late sixties and early seventies, countries like France were satisfied with inventions
showing some qualified novelty. It was only when the EPC and the Strasburg Convention on the
Unification of Certain Points of Substantive Law on Patents for Inventions of November 27, 1963 were
successively ratified by the Contracting Parties that non-obviousnessl inventive step became a common
standard of patentability. See Haertel, The Harnonizing Effects of European Patent Law on National
Patent Lavs, 14 INT'L REv. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHTL. 719 (1983).
100 Compare 35 USC § 112 with EPC, art. 83.
101 Only two aspects have not been considered by TRIPS: 1) determining the scope of protection
by interpretation of the claims, descriptions, the drawings made in the patent applications, and in letters
patent (see EPC, art. 69; compare supra note 56); 2) the problem of contributory infringement (see 35
USC § 271(c) and § 10, PatG). The latter issue may lose its importance once TRIPS is in force, since the
issue of contributory infringement has always been the supply of non-infringing parts for infringement
purposes from abroad. See 35 USC § 271(f) and supra notes 25 and 26.
102 For dependent patents and improvement patents, in particular, three additional conditions have
to be satisfied (art. 31, (1)): 1) the improvement must involve an important technical advance; 2) the
patentee of the improvement must grant a cross-license to the patentee of the basic invention; and 3) the
compulsory license granted on the basic patent may not separately be assigned to third parties.
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on the merits of the individual case and only if it fails to obtain a voluntary
license on reasonable terms.
The compulsory license must be limited in its scope and duration, and
directed to the supply of the domestic market. It must be non-exclusive, nonassignable, and subject to a reasonable remuneration. Its grant must be
subject to both administrative review of its continued opportunity, and ju-

dicial review of its justification, and the reasonableness of the remuneration.
Although the grounds for the grant of compulsory licenses have been specified only by reference to exemplary cases (anticompetitive conduct,
emergencies, dependency of inventions), its primary focus is on domestic
manufacturing and supply requirements. 103 The containment of such requirements has become rigid as Member States have not been left with any
real alternative to compulsory licensing.t 04 Modulation of patent protection
according to technological fields, to the term of the patent, or both 105 has
been rendered impossible by the broad definition of patentable subject matter

and the strict determination of the term of the patent by a minimum of twenty
years. 106
Consequently, the guarantees afforded by patent protection are at least

as adequate as those granted in industrialized countries, like France or the
United Kingdom, which knowingly grant compulsory licenses. No less
adequate is the protection in the areas surrounding patentable inventions. On
the one hand, trade secret protection is provided for on broad terms for
determining both what constitutes 107 and what violates 108 a trade secret. On
103 Similarly, art. 27. (1), enjoins Member States from making the grant of patents dependent
upon local production of the patented goods.
104 In particular, forfeiture for non-use is strictly limited by art. 5 A,
(3) and (4). The Paris
Convention is applicable by virtue of GATT TRIPS, art. 2. See supranote 91.
105 This approach is used by a number of countries. See WIPO, Internationally Accepted
Standards.in GAIT OR WIPO?, supra note 2. at 299, 309.
106 Art. 33 states a minimum of 20 years ("shall not end before"), but does not indicate on which
date the terms begin to run (date ofapplication under most first-to-file systems. See EPC, art. 63; for date
of grant, see 35 USC § 154). Surprisingly enough, the problem of patent term extension for pharmaceuticals and other subject matters, the marketing of which is generally subject to time-consuming admission
procedures, has not been dealt with by TRIPS. cf 35 USC §§ 155. 155A; EPC, art. 63, II, as amended
by the Act Revising Article 63 of the Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent
Convention) of October 5, 1973, O.J. EPO 1992, 1; Pagenberg, Diplomatic Conference on the Revision of
Article 63, EPC, 23 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 248 (1992). for an international
comparison (including the USA and Japan), see Schennen, DIE VERLAGERUNG DER PATENTLAUFZEIT FOR
ARZNEIMITTEL IM GEMEINSAMEN MARKT 1993, passim.

107 Compare GATT TRIPS, art. 39. (2), with Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1, (4), 14 ULA 537,
542; or art. 1, (7), Commission Reg. No. 556/89 (EEC) of November 30, 1989 on the application of art.
85. (3). of the Treaty for certain categories of know-how licensing agreements (OJEC L 61, 1). For a
comparative view, see Ullrich in SOFTWAREVERTRAG, supra note 17, at Teil 1, Kap. 1. § 311B. The TRIPS
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the other hand, computer programs definitely have been elevated to the status
of copyrightable literary works (art. 10). The introduction of these matters
and their form of protection, which in the case of software tend to reinforce
each other I0 9 is quite remarkable. The status of trade secrets as intellectual
property has been contested with a view to leaving it as unprotected under
TRIPS as it was under the national laws of some Member States." 0 There
have also been suggestions to protect software by less embracing means. 111
Doubts about the full application of the Berne Convention with its rather
elaborate system of protection have been buried. The term of protection (fifty
years) has been clarified, 112 and rental rights, which are important in the
software business, have been secured. The scope of software protection has
not been defined more precisely than by a general exclusion of the protection
of 'Ideas, procedures, methods of operation and mathematical concepts as
such" (art. 9 para II). It was left open to a somewhat vague exemption in
favor of fair use and similar privileges because industrialized countries were
unable to produce more legal certainty -through their own domestic
legislation. 113

definition appears to be rather broad. See Ullrich, Nationale Geschaftsgeheimnisse und Gemeinsaner
Markt, RAV BEILAOE23 (1990) 13.
108 According to footnote 10 to art. 39, a manner contrary to honest commercial practices that
amounts to a trade secret violation shall mean "at least practices such as breach of contract, breach of confidence and inducement to breach, and includes the acquisition of undisclosed information by third parties
who knew or were grossly negligent in failing to know, that such practices were involved in the acquisition" (emphasis added). Apart from its tendency to afford absolute exclusivity to the trade secret, this is a
risky definition, since it sets no limit on what contracts may provide with regard to clauses of confidence
and subject-matter. On the other hand, art. 39 does not explicitly address the problem of trade secret
violations outside of breach of contractual confidence, though it certainly permits qualification of practices
of industrial espionage that is contrary to honest commercial conduct. However, there is no reason to
deplore this as a 'trade secret gap," as Reichman does (see Reichman, supra note 90, at 235. 239), since
the delimitation between lawful reverse engineering and dishonest conduct in competition is not a settled
matter in industrialized countries, and since the legitimacy of secrecy is limited in itself. See Ullrich in
SOFrWAREVERTRAO, supranote 17, at Teil 1, Kap. 1, § 311B.
109 See Ullrich in SoFrwAR VERTRAG, supra note 17, at Teil 1, Kap. 1. § 4EB.
110 See Faupel, GA 7T undgeistigesEigentun-Ein Zwtschenberichtzu Beginn der entscheidenden
Verhandlungsrunde, GRUR INT'L, 1990, 255, 263; UNCTAD - TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT 188
(1991). Countries like Japan have introduced know-how protection under the pressure of TRIPS only.
111 See Reinbothe, supra note 90, at 709; Cottier, The Prospectsfor Intellectual Property in
GATT, 28 CM L. R. 383, 402 (1991); UNCTAD, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT 187 (1991); Correa,
The Legal Protection of Software - hnplicationsfor Latecomer Strategies in Newly Industrializing
Countries(NICs) andMiddle-incomne Countries(MICs), 16 INFORMATICA EDIRITTO 131 (1990).
112 See GATT TRIPS art. 12, which will mainly apply to software, which frequently is developed
by enterprises rather than by individual authors.
113 See Ullrich in SOFTWAREVERTRAO. supra note 17. at § 211135; INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. &
COPYRIGHT L. 3.
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Effective Protection

The TRIPS-Agreement seeks to achieve its aim of guaranteeing adequate international intellectual property protection on both the national and
the international levels.

a.

On the National Level

On the national level, TRIPS simply but daringly extends harmonization of national intellectual property law to granting procedures, sanctions for

infringement, and infringement procedures. The effectiveness of the granting
procedure would appear to be of a primary interest to TRIPS, as it represents
a matter of permanent concern in U.S.-Japanese relations. 114 However, the
Agreement deals with it in a summary manner, since pressing this point would
have resulted in a confession of mutual weaknesses and filing tactics. 115
Thus, the Agreement does not go beyond a general obligation to reasonably
fashion the procedure for acquisition and maintenance of intellectual property
rights for its running conditions and formalities. This way an obligation
remains within reasonable periods of time so that the term of protection is not
unduly prolonged. There would also be room for applying the general
principles of equity and fairness (hearing of parties or reasoned opinion etc.
art. 62, 41). The same obligations exist with respect to revocation or
cancellation procedures which, like invalidity claims, seem not to have
interested the Contracting Parties very much since they are referred to only
very marginally in art. 62 para. IV.116
114 See supra note 74 and U.S. Firms' PatentProblents in Japan Confirmed by Survey, 46 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 224 (1993); Bill would Amend "Special 301" to Adress Japanese
Patent Law Inadequacies,44 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 392, 408 (1992).
115 Apart from the first-to-file, first-to-invent controversy (see supra note 62), it must be noted
that establishing a patent office is a highly expensive exercise, the success of which depends on a variety
of factors (administrative skills and traditions, existence of a patent bar, size of the country, and of the
number of patents to be expected, etc.). See WIPO, GUIDE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ON THE
EXAMINATION OF PATENT APPLICATIONS (1982). Even the patent offices of highly developed countries are

permanently struggling with their workload, granting procedures that easily take two to four years. For a
summary analysis, see Zaphiriou. supra note 53, at 889" Rebel. supra note 61, at 46; WIPO.
InternationallyAcceptedStandards,in GATT OR WIPO?, supra note 2. at 220.
116 For instance, by referring only to art. 41. 9 (2) (3), paragraph (4) of art. 62 remains rather
vague as regards the parties' right in administrative procedures (as compared to art. 42). Moreover, there
is no obligation by Member States to establish effective procedures for cancellation and invalidation
procedures that would form a counterpart to the obligation to provide for effective enforcement
procedures. The very idea, that there might be unwarranted patents, which would unduly burden
competition, seems to be outside TRIPS and must be introduced on the uncertain basis of the right to
prevent abuses (see GATT TRIPS, art. 8, 2).
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In contrast, sanctions for infringement and infringement procedures are
dealt with in considerable detail. Thus, TRIPS introduces rules shifting the
burden of proof to the defendant who claims the infringement of process
patents." 7 It further requires the defendant to produce evidence in possession
which supports the plaintiff's claim (art. 43). TRIPS also obliges Member
States to sanction infringement by injunctions (art. 44), by the award of
damages and litigation costs (art. 45), and by decisions ordering that
infringing goods or instruments that have served infringement be disposed of
outside the channels of commerce or, possibly, destroyed (art. 46).118
Enforcement procedures must be tailored, "so as to permit effective action
against any act of infringement ...
including expeditious remedies to prevent
infringements and remedies which constitute a deterrent to further
infringements" (art. 41 para I). The Agreement implements this principle and
the principles of procedural fairness and equity, availability of remedies, and
of specific rules on the right to be heard (art. 42), on indemnification of
defendants that have been pursued abusively, and by a full-fledged regulation
on provisional measures (art. 56). 119
b.

On the InternationalLevel

However precise and detailed, to be put into effective operation the
rules on substantive intellectual property law have been broken down into
immediately applicable concepts and distinctions. 120 TRIPS is not intended
to set up an intellectual property organization directly granting exclusive

117 Compare GATT TRIPS, art. 34 with 35 U.S.C. § 295 and § 139 III, PatG. Many countries do
not accept this shift, however. See PharmaceuticalIP Portfolios, MANAGING INTELL. PROP. Jan-Feb.
1994, at 22.
118 Compare § 140 a, PatG with art. L 615-7 c. prop. int.
GATT TRIPS, art. 47, enables Member
States to introduce in their legislation a right of information of the patentee regarding third-party infringement.
119 Similar care has been taken formeasures to control the import of infringing products (art. 51).
However, these measures are outside the scope of this article, since they relate to trademark counterfeiting
and copyright piracy only. See Harvey, Efforts Under GA7T, WIPO and other Multinational
OrganisationsAgainstTrade Mark Counterfeiting, 12 EUR. INTELL PROP. REv. 446 (1993).

120 For instance, the concept of novelty needs to be defined (absolute or relative novelty, inclusion
of non-disclosed patent applications, admission of a period of grace). See EPC arts. 54-55; 35 USC § 102:
§ 3 12, GebrMG. Contributory infringement (see supranote 101), presumption of validity of patents (35
USC § 282) also need to be solved. Moreover, the exemptions (art. 30), which are indispensable corollaries to protection. must be implemented.
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rights to the nationals of Member States. 121 Rather TRIPS relies on national
law, and consequently, on the principle of national treatment (art. 3).
However, within the framework of TRIPS, the operation of the principle of national treatment is fundamentally different from its operation within
the framework of the Paris or the Berne Conventions. This difference has
been unnecessarily clouded by TRIPS referring expressly to these
Conventions and their national treatment principles. Indeed, national treatment has a different quality when it is supposed to work on the basis of
largely harmonized national intellectual property law. It works within the
context of substantive reciprocity rather than in the context of minimum protection, which leaves the formulation of intellectual property policies to the
sovereign judgment of Member States. Under such circumstances, Member
States no longer grant privileges to foreigners, regardless of their own domestic interest, but rather comply with the obligations of a quid pro quo deal.
The Member States have entered into the deal presumably as legally and
economically equal partners seeking to secure comparable advantages to their
own nationals abroad.
Member States no longer define their national intellectual property
policies with a view to the domestic market only. Rather, they define them
with a view to the interests they have abroad to maintain their intellectual
property interests there. 122 What is more, this national treatment/substantive
reciprocity principle will not be binding merely as a matter of intellectual
property obligations to which the Contracting Parties have subscribed in
TRIPS. Rather, by virtue of the incorporation of TRIPS into the World Trade
Organization, it must be executed as part of the overall balance of rights and
duties, obligations, and concessions agreed upon in the Negotiations. Indeed,
since article 64 of TRIPS refers to art. XXII and XXIII of the GATT 1994,
121 Whether some TRIPS rules may nevertheless be self-executing is a problem which needs carefill
consideration because of the implementation problem (see supra note 120), the dispute
settlement/retaliatory action mechanism of TRIPS/GATr 94 (see infra note 125). and the reciprocity
inherent in the TRIPS system. Certainly, the self-executory character of TRIPS is not as self-evident as
the German government assumes (see Bundesregierung. supra note 3, at 337, 344), nor does it necessarily
follow from Community law in the EC. cf Drexl, Nach "'GA TT und WIPO": Das TRIPS-A bkonunen und
seine Anwendung in der Europaischen Gemeinschaft, GRUR INT'L, 1994, 777. Drexl affirms the selfexecuting character of TRIPS on the ground that it lacks "political character," but he has a rather naive
view of what the political character of an international trade agreement is. and he entirely fails to grasp
the complexity of TRIPS implementation (supra note 120). Moreover. Drexl's position is considerably
weakened by the European Court's advisory opinion of November 15. 1994. (the competence of the
Community to conclude international agreements for services and the protection of intellectual property)
judgement of July 14. 1994. case C-91/92, Faceini Dori/Recreb. GRUR INT'L 1994, 954.
and its
122 This difference explains the resistance which the weaker developing countries have shown vis
AvisTRIPS. See Dhanjee, supra note 52, at 5.
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the dispute settlement procedure of the TRIPS agreement is the same as that

listed in the GATT in general. That dispute settlement procedure ultimately
allows a Contracting Party to sanction TRIPS violations by the suspension of
concession or obligations under other WTO Agreements. 12 3 The dispute
settlement procedure has become much more formalized and efficient, 124 and
there is hardly any alternative to sanctioning TRIPS violations by suspension
of trade concessions.125 Thus, it represents a serious risk, certainly serious
enough to make Member States hesitate before trying to test the outer limits
of the reciprocity resulting from TRIPS intellectual property harmonization.
Legislative discretion of Member States appears to be even more limited.
As a matter of fact, the very raison d'Otre of TRIPS is the sanction
against noncompliance with adequate levels of protection by the withdrawal
of trade concessions made in other areas.126 This threat has been proven to
123 See UNDERSTANDING RULES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
(MTN/FA II - A 2), art. 22, (3), lit. c.
124 See Pescatore, The GA7T Dispute Settlement Mechanism - Its Present Situation and Its
Prospects, 27 J. WORLD TRADE, Number 1, at 5; Petersmann, Improvements to the Functioningof the
GATT-Systenm Including DisputeSettlenent, in A NEW GA'fT FOR THE NINETIES AND EUROPE 92, 109, 113
(Oppermann & Molsberger eds., 1991); Hilf, Settlement of Disputes in International Economic
Organisations: Comparative Analysis and Proposalsfor Strengthening the GA 7T Dispute Settlemuent
Procedures,in THE NEW GATT ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS - LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
PROBLEMS 285, 3 10 (Petersmann & Hilfeds.. 2d ed. 1991); Kohona, Dispute Resolution under the World
Trade Organisation-An Overview, 28 J. WORLD TRADE L. April 1994. at 23.
125 Several reasons account for the inadequacy of sanctioning Member States which fail to sufficiently protect intellectual property by a withdrawal of domestic protection. First, such withdrawal will
hurt individuals rather than a branch of industry in that Member State. Moreover. it has only long-term
effects, since the rights acquired by foreign nationals at the time of the retaliatory action cannot simply be
expropriated. In other words, withdrawal of intellectual property protection is an inefficient measure.
Second, in many instances, sanctions will be counterproductive, since withdrawal of patent protection will
result in increased secrecy, withdrawal of trademark protection or protection of indications of origin will
lead to consumer deception. Third, it is already difficult to determine market losses due to insufficient intellectual property protection other than by very rough estimates, and it is virtually impossible to estimate
just how much intellectual property protection has to be withdrawn to make up for these losses. Fourth,
the very reasons that led to the TRIPS-Initiative prove that intellectual property protection is a central
concern for (some) industrialized countries only, but not for the rest of the world, so that withdrawing
protection will not hurt these other countries. Fifth, it is not clear how withdrawal of intellectual property
protection will hurt another Member State. Withdrawal does not mean that the imports of the goods
which are no longer protected become illegal as such. It will be difficult, even if it were possible and
lawful at all, to sort out illegal imports and impose a tariff. Of course. imports that are illegal as a matter
of infringing intellectual property may be prevented. But the issue is not one of preventing counterfeiting
imports, but one of obtaining protection in the exporting country with respect to that or other countries'
markets. Therefore, it is imports in other areas that must excluded as a matter of retaliatory action.
126 See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Executive Office of the President: Administration
Statement on the Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property Rights Abroad (April 7. 1986). reprinted in 31
Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 506 (1986); The Intellectual Property Committee (USA).
Keidanren (Japan), Union Intemationale des Conf&lrations des Industries et Employeurs Europlens
(UNICE), Basic Framework of GATT Provisions on Intellectual Property - Statement of Views of the
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be rather efficient when exercised by Member States with large domestic
markets.127 The deterrent effect it may produce is the more formidable as it
may, and possibly must be, used not only when intellectual property protection is withheld by a Member State as a matter of principle, but also when it
is granted on overly strict or overly lenient 128 conditions, or if exemptions are
too broadly or too narrowly defined.129 Otherwise, protection fails entirely
and markets are lost completely. WIPO apparently has understood this risk
and has proposed to channel it into intellectual property harmonization
agreements that would implement TRIPS by extending the harmonization into
those technical details of the intellectual property system that TRIPS would
not, and probably could not reach. 130 It came as a surprise only when these
European, Japanese and United States Business Communities, June 1988. reprintedin GATT OR WIPO?,
at 353, 366, 380; Faupel, supra note 110, at 255.
127 This is true for the United States in the case of semiconductor protection. See supra note 33,
34 and other cases; see Antons, IntellectualPropertyLaw in ASEAN countries: A Survey, 3 EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 78 (1991); O'Neill, IntellectualProperty Protection in Thailand: Asia's Young Tiger and
America's "Growing" Concern, II U. PA. J. INT'L. Bus. L. 603, 612 (1990). For software, see Dreier, supro note 33, in GATT OR WIPO?, supra note 2. at 68. The United States has entered into more than 40
bilateral agreements in IP-protection. See Simon, GA TT and NAFTA Provisions on IntellectualProperty,
4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA& ENT. L.J. 267, 272. Similarly, the EC has repeatedly used bilateral

action to insure that its intellectual property interests are protected by other States. See Govaerc,
Intellectual Property Protection and Commercial Property, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S
COMMERCIAL POLICY AFTER 1992: THE LEGAL DIMENSION, Dordrecht 1993, 197, 203 (Maresceau ed.,
1993). In addition, both the United States and the EC attempt to impose their intellectual property
policies within their zones of influence. Moreover, the EC incorporates into its free trade association
agreements with East European countries (so-called Europe Agreements) Community standards of
intellectual property protection. See e.g. Europe Agreement with Hungary, art. 65 and Annex XIII.
reprintedin OJEC 1993, L 347, 1; Europe Agreement with Poland. art. 66 and Annex XII, reprintedin
OJEC 1993, L 348, 1. The European Economic Area Agreement (OJEC 1994, L 1,I) simply obliges
Member States to fully adopt the IP-harmonization measures taken within the EC (see art. 65, (2),
Protocol, and Annex XVII). Similarly, the North American Free Trade Association Agreement of Dec. 8
and 17, 1992, contains a detailed catalogue of intellectual property obligations of Member States. See art.
1701, reprintedin 32 I.L.Mat. 289, 670. Cf Bale Jr., supra note 94, at 21; Gonzales, supra note 94, at
307; Schmidt, Computer Sojhvare and the North American Free Trade Agreement: Will Mexican Law
Representa Trade Barrier? 34 IDEA 33 (1993).
128 Compare the reaction of the United States to the German Federal Supreme Court's formerly
strict requirements of originality for software copyright (de Vries, Comnmission of the EC, Answer to
Written Question No. 823/92, OJEC, 1993, C 51/6 andBGHof May 9,1985, 17 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP.
& COPYRIGHT L. 681 (1986) - "Collection Program," and BGH of July 14. 1993, GRUR. 1993, 39 "Buchhaltungsprogramm") with Ullrich, in GATT OR WIPO?, see supra note 2. at 139.
129 For instance, fair use-exemptions for reverse engineering, see supra notes 108 and 113.
130 For patents, see WIPO, Diplomatic Conference for the Conclusion of a Treaty Supplementing
the Paris Convention, June 3 to 28, 1991 - The "Basic Proposal" for the Treaty and the Regulations, Doc.
PLT/DC/3 of December 21, 1990: Fiorito, supra note 37, at 24; Pagenberg, The WIIPO Patent
Harmonization Treaty, 19 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. Ass'N Q.J. 1 (1991): Thompson, Reforming the Patent
System For the 21st Century, 21 AM. INTELL PROP. L. Ass'N Q.J. 171, 175 (1993). For similar (and
similarly unsuccessful) efforts to globally harmonize software protection within the framework of a
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WIPO efforts failed upon resistance of the main promoter of TRIPS. 131 The

United States has used the carrot-and-stick approach of bilateral trade
agreements by imposing its intellectual property standards on trade partners.
As a result, other nations and organizations might forego the opportunities
132
offered by TRIPS.

In the future the United States and other Member States will be bound
by the rules and the dispute settlement procedure of TRIPS. Moreover, bilateral agreements will become less attractive because of the most favored
nation principle introduced into TRIPS.133 Any advantages thus obtained
must be passed on to all other Contracting Parties. The rigidity of a last detail

harmonization of intellectual property by an international convention may not
be adapted to technical progress by other means than by an international
revision conference. TRIPS, with its adequate protection objective and its
all-encompassing but flexible rules, is much better suited for Member States

revision of the Berne Convention, see Ullrich in SOFTWAREVERTRAG. supra note 17, at Teil 1. Kap. 1. § 4
11C 2.
131 See Schttfcrs & Schnennen, Dererste Tell der DiplomatischenKonferenz u11 Abschluss eines
Vertrages zur Hannonisierungdes Patentrechis,GRUR INT'L, 1991, 849; Pagenberg, supra note 62, at
682; U.S. Says "Not Now" on First-to-FileandAgrees with Japan on Patent Tern, 47 Pat. Trademark &
iht J. (BNA) 285 (1994)
See supra notes 74, 114, 127.
133 The meaning most-favored-nation treatment may have in the context of intellectual property is
all but clear. See Bail in A NEw GATT FOR THE NINETIES AND EUROPE 250 (Oppermann & Molsberger

eds., 1991); Cottier, supra note 111, at 397. In its simplest form. it is just a complement to national treatment, in that it would oblige Member States to facilitate access to their system of intellectual property
protection for all Member States' nationals as for the nationals of Contracting Parties of a bilateral IP
agreement. With this meaning, it may in fact help to dispel fears of smaller countries to be left out
ofinternational standards of protection by bilateral agreements between major countries. See Reinbothe &
Howard, The State of Play in the Negotiationson TRIPS (GATT/Uruguay Round), 5 EUR. INTELL. PROP.
ReV. 157, 159 (1991). Although that fear may be surprising in view of the level of protection attained and
in view of most countries' original resistance to adhere to TRIPS at all, the U.S.-Japan Intellectual
Property Agreement (supra note 114) may present an example (although non-discrimination, as originally
required by the EC, would do as well). GAIT TRIPS art. 4 undercuts Paris Convention art. 19 and Berne
Convention art. 20, both of which expressly allow Member States to conclude more favorable bilateral
agreements. They create new problems, however. The bilateral U.S.-Japan agreements provide that
foreign nationals may file a patent application in English language, if followed by a Japanese translation
within 2 months. Why only English language applications? In addition, the most-favored nation
principle has major drawbacks, which are well known. It prevents parties from making trade concessions
in bilateral negotiations in the first place, and, therefore, results in the necessity to set up multilateral
negotiations. These, in turn, are extremely slow and difficult, as shown by the seven years of the Uruguay
Round. See also Mestrnacker, Free Trade in Services: Regional and Global Perspectives, in RULES FOR
FREE INTRNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES 9, 16 (Friedmann & Mestnwcker eds., 1990). Whether this kind

of reluctance is typical for trade concessions only or whether it will occur in intellectual property
negotiations as well remains to be seen.
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that have the leverage to claim and impose those standards of protection that
34
actually satisfy their changing needs. 1
III.

FULL AND EQUAL PROTECTION, TERRITORIAL RIGHTS, AND GLOBAL
TRADE: PLAYING THE GAME ON SPLIT-LEVELS

A.

TRIPS and Barriersto Trade

1.

TRIPS' Objectives
The purpose of the preceding sections was to show to what extent

TRIPS will change international intellectual property protection. The change
is more revolutionary as the geographical coverage of TRIPS in terms of the
number of countries ratifying the WTO Agreement will be worldwide from
the beginning.135 Member States and the Council for Trade Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property, which TRIPS creates to monitor its operation (art.
68), are likely to ensure that TRIPS is actually complied with. The level of
protection achieved by TRIPS, at least for technological property, clearly
meets the industrialized countries' objective to internationally establish a
modem system of protection of the kind they themselves operate

domestically. 136

Compare TRIPS with what is left of international

harmonization by WIPO, with the state of harmonization in the European

134 Cf Reidenberg, Trade, TRIPS and NAFTA, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA& ENT. L.J. 283,

285 (1993).
135 On the basis of the number of signatories to the WTO, the estimated number of Member States
is about 120, all of which, due to the 'Single Package" approach, must accept TRIPS. In this respect, the
many bilateral agreements concluded by the U.S. and the EC with third countries (see supra note 127) did
facilitate acceptance, since they either fully reflect further TRIPS or even go beyond it. Together with the
free trade agreements (supra note 127), they create regional areas of IP influence, the poles of which are
the United States with NAFTA, and South-East Asia on the one side, and the EC with the European
Economic Area and the East Europe free trade associations on the other side (where the USA has also
been active bilaterally). This regionalization is completed by the Latin American countries associated
within the Andean Group (see Andean Group, Comission Decision 313 of February 6. 1992 - Common
Code on Intellectual Property, reprintedin 32 I.L.M. 180 (1993)) and by the ARIPO and the OAPI in
Africa (see supra note 80). While the latter three groups still have to conform to TRIPS-requirements in
one or the other respect, the former may even enter into conflict with others on the level of
implementation of TRIPS; for example, by implementing the exemptions to protection in different ways.
136 See Sherwood, Why a Uniform Intellectual Property System Makes Sense for the World, in
GLOBAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 8,at 68; Armstrong, Trends in Globlal Science and Technology and
What They Mean for Intellectual PropertySystems, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 8,at 192, 204;
Simon, Remarks made at the Symposium: Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, 22 VAND. J.
TRAN NAT'LL. 367, 368 (1989); BasicFramework, in GATT OR WIPO?, supra note 2,at 362.
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Community, the recently established free trade areas, 137 or with the

industrialized countries' legislation implementing TRIPS. 138 TRIPS has in
fact laid down a worldwide system for equal and adequate protection of
intellectual property. This corresponds perfectly to the basic assumption
upon which TRIPS negotiations have been started by industrialized countries. It was assumed that trade had been hampered by the insufficient or lack
of protection available in many countries, as these would necessarily
constitute a barrier to increased trade with improved and technologically
advanced products, and a distortion of trade in favor of counterfeit and pirated products. 139
Clearly, if TRIPS is to overcome such barriers to and distortion of
trade without instituting new ones, it must rest on additional assumptions.
First, protection of intellectual property must similarly benefit all Members.
Second, the intellectual property available under the GATT is either selfsufficient or amenable to improvement by joint decisions of all Members.
The former goes directly to the heart of the conflict between industrialized
and developing countries. The latter assumes, rightly or wrongly, that
140
enhanced protection will hurt the development of intellectual property.
As mentioned in the beginning, this article is not intended to deal with
either this conflict or with the second assumption, since it underlies all
intellectual property, and is in part purely speculative. 14 1 Instead, I shall try
137 For WIPO harmonization, see supra note 130; for a general account of intellectual property
harmonization in the EC, see Ullrich, Die gemeinschajs-rechtliche Gestaltung des Wettbeiverbsrechts
und des Rechis des geistigen Eigenturns - Eine Skizze, in GEMEINSAMES PRIVATRECHT INDER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFr 325, 346 (Millier-Graff ed., 1993); for the free trade areas, see supra note 127.
138 For the US-GATr implementation legislation, see HR 1156, S.2467. For text ofbill and floor
debate, see GATT Bill ClearsHouse with Major IntellectualPropertyLmv Reforms. 49 Pat. Trademark &
Copyright J.(BNA) 95 (1994). The "major change" in patent law is that the patent term is brought from
17 years to 20 years beginning with the application (instead of with the grant, so the overall term virtually
remain unchanged). Similarly, the Working Party on Harmonization of the EPO (16th meeting, Munich.
July 14, 1994) had only minor amendments to propose for the European Patent Convention (Doc. CA/H
2/94); the same is true for German Law. See BUNDESREGIERUNG. supra note 3, at 337.
139 Compare the Ministerial Declaration, supra note 87; Basic Framework in GATT OR WIPO,
supra note 8 at 361; USA, Suggestionfor achieving the negotiationobjective (GA7T-Doc. AfTN, GNG/NG
11/V/14) in GATT OR WIPO, supra note 8, at 181 with the position held by developing countries (see
Trade Negotiations Committee Meeting at Ministerial Level, Montreal. December 1988, GATT-Doc
MTN. TNC/7 (Min)of December 9, 1988, reprinted in I WORLD TRADE. MAT. 5. 21 (1989). Mid-TermReview, MTN.TNC/I1 of April 21, 1989, 1 WORLD TRADE. MAT. 5,21 (1989-4)) see also Faupel, supra
note 110, at 255.
140 See references supra notes 2, 94; for a disinterested argument that stronger protection may
serve developing countries better see David in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS supra note 8. at 55; Frischtak in
GLOBAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 8, at 89.

141 It may be noted, however, that TRIPS has a built-in development blocker because whenever a
country enhances its intellectual property law it creates a distortion of trade making other Members appear
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to assess TRIPS on the basis of its own rationale, which is that internationally
harmonized national intellectual property protection will enhance international
trade. It will do so by dismantling barriers to trade and by avoiding distortion
of competition. My proposition is that TRIPS may very well enhance trade,
but not as much as is desirable, since TRIPS has not been conceived to
abolish barriers to trade. Whether it helps to prevent distortions of trade will
depend on whether it is supported by national or international competition
policy. That -proposition rests on the distinction between harmonization and
unification of international intellectual property with technology and product
markets.
2.

TRIPS and Territoriality

When TRIPS was introduced to international trade negotiations, one
main objection to the introduction of TRIPS into the GATT was that TRIPS
itself represented trade barriers that ought to be abolished rather than stepped
up to the level of adequate protection.142 This objection was bound to fail not
only because nobody seriously considered abolishment of import restrictions
justified by intellectual property, but also because it did not take into account
the twin rationales of intellectual property: 1) protect technological
information against imitation to allow recovery of its costs and a profit on the
market place; and 2) constitute it as a merchandisable good. 143
Consequently, industrialized countries were quick to rebut the objection by
as pirates by providing inadequate protection. Consequently, it has to submit its improvement proposal to
TRIPS which actually provides for a review of both implementation and amendments (art. 71), and even
obliges Member States to jointly undertake a review in specific cases (art. 27 T III (b)). But will Member
States ever be able to agree on such highly controversial issues like whether copyright has proved to afford
only inadequate protection for software and should be replaced by patent protection or some sui generis
form of protection? See generally supra note 134 and for a discussion of the software-issue, see Barton,
Adapting the Intellectual Property System to New Technologies. in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 8, at
256, 262; Samuelson. A Case Study on Computer Programs, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 8. at
284; Ullrich in SOFrWAREVERTRAO, supra note 17, at Teil 1, Kap. 1,§ 1 and § 2.
142 That view is based on GATT TRIPS art. XX lit (d) allowing Contracting Parties to adopt supposedly trade-restrictive - "measures necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations relating
...
to the protection of patents, trademarks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices". For
a discussion of this issue see Reichman, supra note 52. at 828. GATT TRIPS art. XX (a) may be
compared to EEC art. 36 which has been construed by the European Court of Justice as implying a
distinction between intellectual property-based obstacles to trade and the legitimate protection of
intellectual property the scope of which is autonomously determined by Member States and subject only to
harmonization (EEC art. 100), see Ullrich in GEMEINSAMES PRIVATRECHT IN DER EttROPAISCHEN
GEMEINSCHAFT 339 (Milller-Graff ed., 1993).
143 See David in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 8, at 25; Ullrich. PRIVATRECHTSFRAOEN. supra
note 83, at 11, 22.
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pointing out the merits of enhancedintellectual property 's an instrument to
support technology transfer. 144 In fact, the argument carries much beyond the
learning rationale of vertical transfer of technology from industrialized to
developing countries. To the extent that technology is bought from outside
the firm and from abroad rather than produced inside the firm and
domestically, it is traded as such among industrialized or industrializing
countries in the world market. 145 This may occur in non-embodied form
through contract research or licensing by third parties or affiliated companies. 146 It may also happen in embodied and in non-embodied form within
the framework of outsourcing strategies. Such strategies depend on the
subcontracts which assure the control over the flow of technology, a major
factor of which is their appropriability by exclusivity rather than by mere
reliance on contractual privity. 147 In the case of computer programs, appropriability becomes even more important, though for slightly different reasons,

144 The Intellectual Property Committee in GATT OR WIPO, supranote 2, at 363; Kastenmeier &
Beier, International Trade and Intellectual Property: Promise. Risks, and Reality. 22 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 285. 301 (1989); Mansfield. Unauthorized Use of Intellectual Property: Effects on
Investment, Technology Transfer, and Innovation, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 8,at 107. 109; but
see Mowery et al., "Global IntellectualPropertyRights Issues in Perspective," in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS,
supra note 8. at 368.
145 See Radnor, Technology Acquisition Strategies and Processes: A Reconsideration of the
"Make or Buy" Decision, in ON THE INCREASING RoLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN CORPORATE POLICY, SPECIAL

ISSUE. INT'L J. TECH. MGMT. 113 (Gold ed. 1991); Teece, Capturing Value fron Technological
Innovation: Integration, Strategic Partnering,and Licensing Decisions, in TECHNOLOGY AND GLOBAL
INDUSTRY 65 (Guile & Brooks eds., 1987) [hereinafter TECHNOLOGY AND GLOBAL INDUSTRY]; Granstrand
et al., External Technology Acquisition in Large Multi-Technology Corporations,22 RES. & DEV.
MOMT., Number 2, at 111 (1992); Chatterij etal.. Benefitting From ExternalSources of Technology REs.
TECH. MOGMT., Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 21.

146 This is due to the fact that R & D still is a centralized activity of multinational firms, see Patel
& Pavitt, Large Firms in the Production of the World's Technology: An hnportant Case of "NonGlobalisation", 1991 J. INT'L BUS. STUD. 1: Doz, International Industries: Fragmentation Versus
Globalization, in TECHNOLOGY AND GLOBAL INDUSTRY 96, 104 (Guile & Brooks eds., 1987) (R.
& D is
central, technology global); contra Armstrong, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 8, at 197; see also

Mansfield, in GLOBALDIMENSIONS. supra note 8. at 116. The proliferation ofR & D laboratories that are
established abroad does not belie centralization, as their functions are generally subservient to central
strategies, and as the phenomenon is limited to some countries and technologies, see Serapio & Dalton,
ForeignRandD Facilitiesin the United States, REs. TECH. MGMT.. Nov.-Dec 1993, at 33; Papanastassiou
& Pearce, The Internationalisationof Research and Development by Japanese Enterprises, 24 RES. &
DEV. MGMT. 155 (1994).

147 See generally Hagedorn, Global Strategies in Innovation: networks in research and
production, in ON THE INCREASING ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN CORPORATE POLICY, SPECIAL ISSUE, INT'L J.
TECH. MGMT. 81, 84 (Gold ed. 1991): COMMISSION OF THE EC, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LEGAL ASPECTS OF
INDUSTRIAL SUB-CONTRACTING WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, VOL I - StB-CONTRACTS - BRUSSELS

at 51 (1989); Schitz. EG-KartellrechtlicheBetrachtung der Zuliefervertrdge in der Automobilindustrie.
WUW 1989, I111.113; OECD, supra note 34, at 29,42.
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since they are not generally traded as a 'technology but as an intangible
good. 148

Generally, industry develops technology for the innovative manufacture
of products or for the manufacture of innovative products. Consequently, if it
seeks the exclusivity of intellectual property, it does so in order to protect the
products which embody its technology and which, through their sale, will
make consumers pay for this "embodied" technology. Thus, innovative
technologies have value only to the extent that the products are sought after in
the market. It is the protection of the products which protects the value of a
technology. Such protection is not always perfect, in that patents do not
necessarily cover an entire technology, cover it sufficiently, or cover it at
all. 14 9 Trade secrets or copyright may only be poor substitutes. 150
However, TRIPS removes the principal obstacle to internationally
protecting processes and products, namely the non-availability or non
enforceability of intellectual property in many countries. 151 This is important
because industry strategies for protecting intellectual property are not directed
at protecting processes or products, but at protecting the geographical

markets where the protected products are sold or to which the products
resulting from a protected process are supplied. 152 To this end, enterprises
may directly seek protection with respect to the geographical market supplied. They may also seek to protect these markets by acquiring an
148 Computer programs may embody technology in the form of bath programming techniques and
teachings ofprocesses of manufacturing, controlling, testing etc. Frequently, and simultaneously, they are
intangible tools for carrying out such processes or methods like bookkeeping. In this form they are products like other technical devices; they may be sold in intangible or tangible form, and they may be more or
less appropriable in either form depending on whether they are transferred in source code or in object
code. Therefore, they cut across traditional distinctions, and it is excessive to generally treat them as
intangible, hardly appropriable goods, cf.Jussawallah, THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN A
WORLD wrrHOUr FRONTIERS - A STUDY ON COMPUTER SOFTWARE (1992). supra note 8. However, as
important as these aspects of intellectual property may be and whatever increased potential they will
develop in the future, they have not been the main driving forces behind TRIPS.
149 The spectrum reaches from product patents (pharmaceutical compounds) to complex technologies involving a number of patents and know how and to complementary technologies or to the results
of basic science (discoveries are not patentable!); see Teece. in TECINOLOGY AND GLOBAL INDUSTRY 67
(Guile & Brooks eds.. 1987). Franke, Die Bedeutung des Patentwesens im Innovationsprozed - Probleme
und Verbesserungsmoglichkeiten, Ifo-Studien 1993, (3-4) 307, 309 et seq.. Much of the weakness, however, may not become relevant due to compensating factors (learning costs. headstart-advantages. market
structures etc.).
150 Unlike a patent. a copyright does not protect the idea or the technical teaching, but only its
presentation (expression), and-it does so only against imitation (copying), not against independent
-parallel" creation, both characteristics making copyright an ambivalent instrument for protecting
software, see references supra note 141.
151 See supraPart II A 3 of this Article.
152 See references supra note 72.
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exclusivity in the country or in the countries where the competing supplier(s)
are located. Where they actually seek protection depends on many factors,
such as costs, reliability and ease of enforcement of protection, and mobility
of supply and demand. It also depends on whether enterprises only want to
protect their domestic market or foreign markets as well. Additionally, it will
depend on whether they want to exclude a competitor in third country
markets by protecting this market, or by attacking the competitor directly
through a patent exclusivity,153 or through competition in the domestic
product market.
The crucial question in choosing an international intellectual property
strategy is how to minimize the costs of acquisition, maintenance, and enforcement of protection while maximizing both the control over competitors
and the gains from the market. The basis upon which to rest a decision will
always be the principle of territoriality. This is so because there is neither a
central granting authority for intellectual property operating on a global scale,
nor a central administration or a court system having worldwide jurisdiction
over matters of validity or enforcement. 154 As it is impossible to unify
international intellectual property, TRIPS did not consider harmonizing
national laws. It also did not modify the traditional structure of exclusive
rights which derive their legitimation from the sovereign grant by the nation
state.
Although centralization of the administration and the enforcement of
international intellectual property might have its advantages, it is not likely to
materialize in the near future because, politically and economically, the world
is far from being ready for such a revolutionary and expensive step. 155
Besides, some facilitation of access to international protection already

153 See for the latter strategy Doz. in TECHNOLOGY AND GLOBAL INDUSTRY 101 (Guile & Brooks
eds.. 1987).
154 It should be noted that, on the one hand, such difficulties exist for software copyright as well
because its ease of acquisition is compensated for by enforcement risks (no examined title, no claims
fixing the scope of protection, uncertainty whether allegedly infringing software is an imitation or an
independent creation). On the other hand, international conventions for the recognition and execution of
judgements exist, but cannot help avoid the need of multiple litigation against multiple acts of
infringement.
155 A deterring example, of course. is the ill-fated Community Patent, the Convention Establishing
a Patent for the Common Market (OJEC 1989 L 401) having little prospect to ever be ratified by its
Member States. see Europaische Gemeinschaften - Lissaboner Gemeinschaflspatentkonferenz gescheitert.
GRUR INT'L, 1992, at 560. and for the difficulties, see Neukom, What Price the Comnmunity Patent? 4
EUR. INT. PROP. 111 (1992); Hilti. The Future European Conununity Patent vstent and its Effects on
Non-EEC-Member-States. 18 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. Ass'N. Q.J. 289 (1990).
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exists. 156 Moreover, territoriality has its own specific advantages. It allows
for focus on patenting strategies in the markets of interest and on the site of
likely competitors. While territoriality may increase the costs and risks of
controlling infringers through enforcement, it also spreads the risk of attacks
made by competitors on the scope or on the validity of protection over several
territories. 157 In addition, a global intellectual property system would benefit
primarily globally operating enterprises, 158 which are best able to handle
internationally harmonized national systems while largely benefiting from
territoriality.
Territoriality is, indeed, not just a means to protect a niche for enterprises operating on a geographically limited scale. It also provides enterprises
supplying international markets with both the opportunity to benefit from
locally prevailing demand inelasticities by charging different prices in
different territories, and to negate comparative advantages of competitors
having their home base in territories with lower factor costs. 159 It is the very
160
to
purpose of technology property, such as patents or software copyright,
allow its owner to maximize profits by manufacturing and selling the
protected products under an exclusivity that is supposed to operate as a
reward collecting device and as an incentive. 16 1 However, it is questionable
that a competitor should be allowed to do so on the basis of the territorial
independence of national intellectual property which has been internationally
harmonized to undo distortions of trade. It would appear that the marketdividing effects of the principle of territoriality cannot draw upon any other
justification than on the historical principle, which is rooted in the concept of
156 See supra notes 79-81. Patent acquisition strategies will not only use these possibilities, but
also benefit from the indirect advantage that patents that have been examined by one reputed examination
authoristwill enjoy a factual presumption of validity in other countries as well.
This may in part explain industry's satisfaction with the European Patent Convention resulting
in the grant of a bundle of national rights as distinguished front the Community Patent that would be unitary for the entire Conunon Market, and, consequently, could and would be attacked and invalidated
centrally, see Ullrich, Patentschutzint Europaischen Binnemnarkt, GRUR INT'L 1991, 1, 10.

158 See Bertin, in RESULTS AND METHODS, supra note 8, at 96; Greif, State and Development of
Economic PatentResearch in the FederalRepublic of Germanvy, in RESULTS AND METHODS supra note 8,
at 113, 128; Shapiro, supra note 72, at 40. Uehara, Intellectual PropertyRights and Competitive Strategy
- A MultinationalElectronicFirm, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 8, at 228 (absolute patent numbers

probably are exaggerated due to Japanese claiming methods); Ttiger & Bockenfeld, 1992: THE STIMULUS
FOR CHANGE IN BRITISH AND GERMAN INDUSTRY - ENTwiCKLOUN DER PATENTAKTIVIT,,TEN VON IN- UND
AUSLANDISCHEN UNTERNEHMEN NDEUTSCHLAND UND GROABRrrANNIEN Ch. 6 (1993).
159 See Ullrich in GATT OR WIPO, supra note 2, at 131 with references.
160 See EC-Directive on the legal protection of computer programs of May 14, 1991, preamble.
considerations 2. 3 (OJEC 1989 L 122, 42): generally, however, the incentive rationale is not accepted for
copyright protection as understood by continental copyright law, see supra note 9.
161 See references supra note 9.
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identity of the territorial reach of a state's sovereign control and the extension
162
of the market for which this state grants a privilege.
The conditions for the grant of the privilege are supposed to be tailored
to allow its owner to reap the reward and incentive from the market for which
the exclusivity is granted. This should also be the rationale of TRIPS, which
is based on the premise that the globalization of markets must be matched by
an adequate level of intellectual property protection. However, instead of
taking this globalization into account in determining the territorial scope of
protection, TRIPS divides protection into a bundle of national rights. It also
determines the reward of the intellectual property owner by a multitude of
aggregated national markets.
Surprisingly enough, this basic contradiction within the TRIPS philosophy has not encountered much opposition. Rather, it has been implicitly
incorporated into art. 6 by way of an express exclusion of the principle of
international exhaustion of intellectual property rights subsequent to the first
authorized sale of a protected product. 163 Article 6, in its abstruse form, does
not contain an outright rule excluding international exhaustion. Instead, it
leaves this as a matter of individual concern for Member States, which may
provide for the principle of exhaustion through domestic legislation.
However, article 6 expressly disclaims the exhaustion principle as a TRIPS
issue. Thus, it makes it clear that Member States are in no way held to admit
64
exhaustion.1
Abstaining from ruling on "the" trade-related aspect of intellectual
property was apparently not enough. It has been suggested that a Member
State's admission to international exhaustion may constitute inadequate
162 Cf

Joos,

DIE ERSCHOPFUNGSLEHRE

IM URHEBERRECHT

-

EINE UNTERSUCHUNG

ZU

RECHTSINHALT UND AUFSPALTBARKEIT DES URHEBERRECHTS MIT VERGLEICHENDEN HINWEISEN AUF

WARENZEICHENRECHT, PATENTRECHT UND SORTENSCHUTZRECHT 131 (1991) with references; with respect
to trademark law,-see Riehle. MARKENRECHT UND PARALLEuLMPORT - EIN BEITRAG ZU GRUNDLAGEN uND
ZU TERRITORIALITAT DESWARENZEICHENRECHTS, 81 (1968).

163 For the principles and the rationale underlying the German. European and U.S.-American exhaustion doctrine see Joos, supra note 162 passim; Rieble, supra note 162 passim: Stem. Vertical
Restraints in the United States ofAmerica: Exhaustion of Rights by an Authorized Sale, After the GTE
Sylvania Case, INDUS. PROP. 1985, 278; Stern, The Unobserved Demise of the Exhaustion Doctrine in US
Patent Law, 12 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 460 (1993) (criticizing strongly, but probably wrongly,
Mallinckrodt. Inc. v. Medipart, Inc.. 976 F. 2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
164 However, if they admit international exhaustion, than they must do so on a most-favorednation-basis, i.e. without discrimination as to where parallel imports come from and as to whom the intellectual property affected belongs to. This appears to be the meaning of the introductory sentence of art. 6.
Still, it is an ackward approach since in this case most-favored-nation treatment operates in the classic
sense of lowering import restrictions while in the context of TRIPS it appeared to be intended to extend
intellectual property protection granted with respect to nationals of one Member State to those of all other
Member States.
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protection for intellectual property held in that state by nationals of other
Member States. 165 At any rate, since industrialized countries are reluctant to

admit international exhaustion except in the area of trademark law, 166 and
since the European Community insists on giving a deterring demonstration of
refusal of international exhaustion,1 67 there is little hope that the exhaustion
principle will ever generally be recognized as a means to reduce those price
differentiating strategies that are imposed all the way down to retail trade. 168
The result is not only that national consumers may be deprived by national
law of the benefits of cheaper import supplies, but also that they are held as
the domestic hostages of pricing policies aimed at supplying foreign markets

at lower prices. This is a classical dumping situation, which is based not on
the legitimacy of intellectual property but on the principle of territoriality,
which segregates the export from the import markets in the manner normally
required for dumping to be effective.
International harmonization of intellectual property aims at fairness in
international trade by ensuring exclusive rewards corresponding to what
165 See Cottier, supra note 111, at 399.
166 See e.g. for patents BGH of June 3, 1976, GRUR 1976, 579 - "Tylosin" reprintedin 8 INT'L
REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 64 (1977) and Joos, supra note 162, at 134 with references; for copyright see § 17 II UrhG, and BGH of February 27, 1981, GRUR Int.
1981, 562 - "Schallplattenimport"
reprinted in 13 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHTL. 93 (1982); BGH of October 28, 1987, GRUR
1988, 373, 374 - "Schallplattenimport III"; Joos, supra note 162, at 138 with references; Loewenheim, in
KOMMENTAR, supra note 14, at § 17 annot. 15 with references; for trademarks the survey of national laws,
see Beier & von Mflhlendahl, Der Grundsaz der internationalenErschopfung des Markenrechtsin den
Mitgliedstaaten der EG und ausgewtihlten Drittstaaten, Mrrr. PAT. ANw. 1980. 101; Heath, From
"Parker'"to "'BBS" - The Treatment of Parallel Imports in Japan, 24 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. &
COPYRIGHT L. 179 (1993): for a comparative analysis see also infra note 168.
167 See CJEC of June 15, 1976, case 151/75. EMI-Records, CBS Schallplatten, Rep. 811 at 847,
and with respect even to parallel imports from free trade associations to the EC CJEC of February 9, 1982,
case 270/80, Polydor/Harlequin Record, Rep. 1982, 329, 346; cf Trademark Directive art. 7 (OJEC 1989
L 40,1); Community Trademark Regulation art. 13 (OJEC 1994 L 11, 1); Commission, Reply of April 26,
1994 to the Written Questions No. E 3482/93, 3483/93 and 3484/93 (OJEC 1994 C 340, 37); but see
Beier, Industrial Property and the Free Movement of Goods in the Internal EuropeanMarket, 21 INT'L
REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 131, 159 (1990): Ebenroth, GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTrz UND
EUROPAISCHE WARENVERKEHRSFREIHEIT 27. art. 4 (c) (1992): art. 15 Draft Design Directive (OJEC 1993
C 345, 14); art. 24 Draft Community Design Regulation. (OJEC 1994 C 29. 20); with respect to the
European Economic Area see Prtndl, Exhaustion of JP Rights in the EEA Applies (Does Not Apply) to
Third-country Goods Placed on the EEA Market, 6 EUR. INTELL. PROP. R.231 (1992); cf.Abbey. 2 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 43 (1993). Inside the Common Market, Community-wide exhaustion is strictly applied, see Ullrich in GEMEINSAMES PRIVATRECHT INDER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT 339 (Mtller-Graff
ed.. 1993): Ullrich, Patentsand Know How, Free Trade, Inter-enterprise Cooperation and Competition
Within the InternalMarket, 23 INT'L REv. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 587 (1992).
168 For a recent rekindling of the issue see Yusuf & Moncayo von Hase, Intellectual Property
Protection and International Trade - Exhaustion of Rights Revisited, 16 WORLD COMPETITION,
September. 1992, at 115; Lansing & Gabriella. Clarifying Gray Market Areas. 31 AmI. Bus. L.J. 313
(1993). It should be noted, that territorial protection against direct imports remains intact.
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markets yield under conditions of global competition. Are we then not entitled to expect such territoriality-based dumping practices to be outlawed?
Similarly, because article 6 makes the principle of territoriality a
sanctuary for TRIPS, there is little hope for finding support for alleviating
TRIPS-territoriality in the areas of export control. It would be tempting, to
deny domestic infringement of intellectual property rights in cases where the
alleged infringer manufactures or sells the protected products for export
only. 169 In such cases, national intellectual property is used exclusively to
control competition in foreign markets. As TRIPS guarantees equivalent
protection on the foreign market, the principle of territoriality as a conflict of
laws rule ought to be replaced by a competition-oriented conflicts rule
resulting in the application of the law of the market affected by the export or
import. 170 This would avoid interference with national sovereignty over the
import market, which is the inherent goal the principle of territoriality.
However, the European Community insists on making export as such an act
of infiingement. 171 Which country would dare to be more liberal than this
fortress built on liberalism?
B.

TRIPS: Trade, Competition, and Technology Policy

1.

Competition and Cooperation

Although the principle of territoriality applies to intellectual property
whether traded as such or in an embodied form, it has the greatest impact on
the product market. It tends to interrupt the free flow of goods across borders.
Thus, it segregates the markets into groups of products and technology that
enjoy similar global protection and, consequently, may be easily transferred
worldwide. It is not clear whether this split-level of trade with its specific
169 See supra text accompanying note 25.
170 That rule, which brings into play more or less strict intellectual property protection (e.g. as regards scope of claims, exemptions, damages) is that applied to acts of unfair competition (which TRIPS is
intended to prevent), see Kreuzer in 7 MONCHENER KOMMENTAR art. 38, annot. 231, 241 (2d ed. 1990);

Schricker in UWG-GROAKOMMENTAR Einl. F. 183 (Jacobs et al. eds.. 1994). For the traditional rule see
references supra note 26 and Joos, supranote 162. at 50.
171 See Trademark Directive art. 5 3(c); Community Trademark art. 9 2(c); Community
Trademark art. 12 11 Draft Community Design arts. 20-21. The Community Patent, however, and the
Computer-Program-Protection Directive do not indulge in such excesses. See Community Patent
Convention art. 25 (OJEC. 1989, L 401.1). The blame should not be put only on the EC: The United States
has obliged trading partners to install a control over exports of infringing domestic products, see with respect to Taiwan, Trainer, Intellectual PropertyProtectionAlong ForeignBorders. 21 AM. INTELL PROP.
L. Ass'N Q. J.313, 319 (1993).
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profit maximization potential is really necessary to achieve the ultimate
objective of TRIPS: Enhance trade in innovative goods at the expense of
imitative products.
TRIPS should not be blamed for attempting to go at least halfway to a
harmonized system of international intellectual property protection, since
going all the way to a genuine world intellectual property system is politically
impossible. Nonetheless, the goal of establishing and maintaining a global
system of dynamic competition should not be abandoned. Technology
property is granted as a stimulus to invention and innovation within a system
of competition that otherwise would run into a stalemate caused by free-riding
72
imitation. 1
The basic idea underlying TRIPS is that inadequate protection of intellectual property will result in a barrier to trade. This idea rests on the
premise that trade is no longer for goods as such but for innovative products
and processes which, in the absence of protection, would not be brought into
the market for fear of competing imitation. In other words, TRIPS is not
aimed at trade as such, but at trade based on a certain form of competition,
namely, competition for innovation. Therefore, the frame of reference of
TRIPS is the same as that of intellectual property protection under national
law.17 3

The optimal operation of intellectual property exclusivities granted
nationally depends on the proper functioning of domestic markets. Similarly,
the benefits expected from the international harmonization of intellectual
property accrue only under conditions of workable competition. In both
cases, care must be taken so that it is the market which invites competion for
exclusivities. Once obtained, the exclusivity must be exercised under the
threat of competing exclusivities and, ultimately, under the threat of imitation.
It is only then that intellectual property will produce the innovations
demanded by the market, and that it will yield market rewards based on
exclusive rights, rather than non-market rewards based on monopoly rights. 17 4
172 See references supra note 9.
173 Cf the analysis made with respect to national as well as international microchip protection.

Chesser, Semiconductor Chip Protection: Changing Roles for Copyright and Competition, 71 VA. L. REv.
249 (1985).

174 See references supra note 83. It is only on the basis of this competition-rationale of intellectual
property protection that courts faced with claims of an abusive exploitation of intellectual property may
and do distinguish between the exclusivity and the monopoly, see Court of Justice of the EC of June 15,
1976, case 5175, EMI Records/CBS United Kingdom, Rep. 1976, 811, 851 reprinted in 7 INT'L REV.
INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIOHT L. 275 (1976); of May 23, 1978, Case 102/77, Hoffmann La
Roche/Centrafarm, Rep. 1978, 1139. 1168 reprinted in 9 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 580
(1978); of October 5. 1988, Case 53/87, CICRA/Renault, Rep. 1988. 6039, 6072 reprinted n 20 INT'L
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As the preamble to TRIPS warns, care must be exercised so that "measures
and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves
become barriers to legitimate trade."
a.

Dynamic competition andfairness oftrade

Dynamic competition for innovation is not the only rationale underlying
the protection of intellectual property. Guarantee of fair trade is actually the
central purpose. Therefore, TRIPS may not be understood simply as an
extension of that national technology policy approach-the promotion of
innovation-- underlying any system of intellectual property protection. Nor
may it be assessed only in terms of whether the intellectual property approach
taken was well chosen. 175 Though certainly important, this would answer
only one half of the question. Competition has always been the thriving force
behind free international trade. If TRIPS introduces true intellectual property
into international trade to change the nature of the goods traded, then it must
also accept and even foster competition to promote the necessary competition
for innovation.
A competition policy for TRIPS must reflect the new dimension of
intellectual property protection when applying traditional antitrust concepts.
Thus, competition analysis should account for the adequate levels of protection achieved internationally. Relevant markets, market power, and the
potential for competition must be assessed with due regard to the increased
possibilities to control markets and imitative competition, so that intellectual
property protection is available and enforceable in similar terms throughout
global markets. Hence, intellectual property strategies followed by firms
must be given more attention. 176 On the other hand, in evaluating contractual
REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 186 (1989); the risk of confusion becomes clear in EC 1st Inst. of
July 10, 1991, Case T-76/89, ITP/Commission, Case T-69/89, RTE/Commission, and Case T-70/89.
BBC/Commission, Rep. 1991-11485, 535, 575; for a critique of the latter decision. which is on appeal, see
Thompson. Mandatory Licensing Under art. 86, 3 EUROPAISCHES WIRTsCHAFTS- uIND STEURRECHT 178
(19927/5 For a detailed analysis, see Reichman,
The TRIPS Component of the GA7Ts Uruguay
Round:
Competitive Prospectsfor Intellectual Property Owners in an Integrated World Market, 4 FORDHAM
INTELL PROP. MEDIA & Er.

L.L 171 (1993).

Reichman also points to the necessity of competition

policy as a counterpart to TRIPS, though in a somewhat non-committal way, see id.at 265.
176 See supra note 72. It should be noted that analyzing the technology position and strategy of
competitors on the basis of patent statistics has become a serious approach which big enterprises already
use, and which will become more reliable as, due to harmonization, national patents are made more
comparable, see Faust, Patentamneldungen als Indikator von technologischen Entwicklungen Ergebnisse und Erfahrungen mit der Ifo-Patentstatistik,[hereinafterFaust], in RESULTS AND METHODS,
supra note 8, at 155; Ashton & Sen, Using PatentInformation in Technology B usmess Planning - I, 11.
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arrangements like sub-contracting, out-sourcing and licensing, competition
policy must re-assess the trade restrictions inherent in intellectual property

protection. 177 It must also distinguish their legitimate procompetitive effects
from those that do not share the rationale of protection but are extraneous to
it.
In this respect, territoriality must be viewed critically, since in the
context of internationally harmonized intellectual property protection and
global competition across national markets, it is no more than a remnant of
times when intellectual property policy could be defined nationally. As
GATT-TRIPS forecloses such national policies in the interest of international
innovation and trade in technology, territoriality may no longer be allowed to
legally separate licences according to national territories where,
economically, the licenses are intended to be coherent parts of an international licensing strategy covering a global market. This would protect against
parallel imports through implicit cooperation, where the much criticized and
misinterpreted case law of the European Court of Justice might be
successfully applied.178 This would also be the case for the admissibility of
territorially limited licenses in general. Whatever the appropriate standards
may be when territorial licenses are not assessed against the background of a
unitary national or a Common Market, 179 antitrust is by no means bound to
take intellectual property-based territorial divisions as sacrosanct. Rather, it
would tend to disregard the artificial territoriality of international intellectual
property that has been harmonized for the global extension of markets.

RES. TECH. MGMT., Nov.-Dec. 1988, at 42; Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 36: Mogee, Using Patent Data for
TechnologyAnalysis and Planning,REs. TECH. MGMT., July-Aug. 1991, at 43; Narin & Noma. Patentsas
Indicators of Corporate Technological Strength, 16 RES. POL'Y. 143 (1987); There is no reason that
competition policy should not equally use this analytic tool; with respect to the determination of
technology

markets,

see

Schwab,

DIE

GRUNDLAGEN

DER

ABGRENZUNG

DES

RELEVANTEN

TECHNOLOGIEMARKTES 133, 187 (1994).
177 For various national approaches, see Schmid. GEBIETSBESCHRANKUNGEN IN PATENTLIZENZUND KNOW-HOW-VERTRAOEN IMWrTTBEWERBSRECHT DER USA UND DER EG, 81, 279 (1987); Wedekind,
DIE ANWENDUNG DER KARTELLVORSCHRIFTEN DES EWG-VERTRAGES AUF PATENTLIZENZVERTRAGE, 24,

33, 152 (1989); Bleeke & Rahl, supra note 78, at 450 (1979).
178 CJEC of July 13, 1966, case 56 and 58/64, Grundig, Consten/Commission, Rep. 1966, 321,
393; of February 11, 1971, case 40/70, Sirena/Eda. Rep. 1971, 69, 81; of June 15, 1976, case 51/75. EMI
Records/CBS United Kingdom, Rep. 1976, 811, 850: but see Ebenroth & Htibschle, GEWERBUCHE
SCHUrZRECHTE UND MARKTAUFrEILUNG IMBINNENMARKT DER EUROPAISCHEN UNION 70, 142 (1994);

Kunze, Waiting for Sirena 11 - Trademark Assignment in the Case Lmv of the European Court of Justice.
22 INT'LREV. PROP. & CoPYRiOrr L. 319 (1991).
179 See supra note 177.
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R&D cooperation

The new dimension which international intellectual property will take
on under TRIPS has implications for formulating competition policy for both
product and technology markets. Formerly, some contract research or the
transfer of existing technology through licensing had been relatively small and
was more or less closely linked to product markets. I80 It has expanded
considerably during the last one and a half decade because of the spread of
R&D cooperation between firms on the national and the international level.181
Through long-range strategic alliances, 182 firms hoped to gain access to new,
mostly complementary technology and exchange of information, coupled with
a more competitive position and reduced cost or risk.183 Thus, the need for
such technology access may be explained by the increasingly interdisciplinary
character of advanced industrial technologies as well as by their linkages to
basic research. 184
However, the large share of R&D cooperation held by information
technologies, biotechnology, and new materials 85 points to additional rea180 For an empirical analysis of licensing practice see Greipl & iger, WETBEWERBSWIRKUNGEN
DER UNTERNEHMERISCHEN PATENT- UND LIZENZPOLITIK 71 (1982): Vickerey. A Survey of International

Technology Licensing, 4 STI-REv.1988 (4) 7.
181 See OECD, TECHNOLOGY AND THE ECONOMY - THE KEY RELATIONSHIPS, (1992) at 72.
Hagedoom, Global Strategies in Innovation: Networks in Research and Production, in ON THE
INCREASING ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN CORPORATE POLICY, SPECIAL ISSUE, INT'L J. TECH. MGMT. 81 (Gold
ed. 1991); Brainard, InternationalizingR and DA174 OECD-OBSERVER 7 (Mar.-Apr. 1992); Chatterij et

al., Benefiting From External Sources of Technology, RES. TECH. MGMT., Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 24;
Grandstrand et al. 22 (2) RES. & DEv. MGMT. 116 (1992); Chesnais, Technical CooperationAgreements
Between Firms,STI-REv. 1988 (4) 51.
182 See OECD, TECHNOLOGY AND THE ECONOMY - THE KEY RELATIONSHIPS (1992) at 226:
Basedow, STRATEGISCHE ALLIANZEN - DIE VERNETZUNG DER WELTWIRTSCHAFT DURCH PROJEKTBEZOGENE
KOOPERATION IM DEUTSCHEN UND EUROPAISCHEN WETTBEWERBSRECHT 6, 65 (1993): Mytelka, Crisis,

Technological Change and the Strategic Alliance, in STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS - STATES, FIRMS AND
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION 7 (Mytelka ed., 1991): Compton, Cooperation, Collaboration, and

Coalition: A Perspective on the Types and Purposesof Technology Joint Ventures, 61 ANTITRUST L.J.
861 (1993).
183 See Peterson, Assessing the perforniance of European Collaborative R & D Policy: The Case
of Eureka, 22 RES. POL'Y. 243, 256 (1993); OECD, TECHNOLOGY AND THE ECONOMY - THE KEY
RELATIONSHIPS (1992) at 74; Hlusler et al., Contingencies of Innovative Networks: A Case Study of

Successful Interfirn R & D Collaboration,23 RES. POL'Y. 47, 48 (1994): Ciborra, Alliances as Learning
Experiments: Cooperation, Competition and Change in HightechIndustries,in STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS
- STATES, FIRMS AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION 51, 61 (Mytelka ed., 1991).

184 HAusler et al., supra note 183; Basedow, supra note 182, at 7; Mylelka in STRATEGIC
PARTNERSHIPS - STATES, FIRmS AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION 7 (Mytelka ed., 199 1).

185 See Brainard, supra note 181, at 9; Hagedoorn. in ON THE INCREASING ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY

IN CORPORATE POLICY, SPECIAL ISSUE, INT'L J. TECH. MGMT. 88 (Gold ed. 1991); OECD, TECHNOLOGY
AND THE ECONOMY - THE KEY RELATIONSHIPS (1992) at 73, 227.
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sons. Indeed, all these technologies are not only developing very rapidly and
cut across industries as key technologies, but they are also know-how
intensive. They are kept secret largely for lack of patentability 86 or as a
matter of business strategy. The international system of intellectual property,
as codified in TRIPS, contributes to the maintenance of such secrecy.
Copyright protection for software covers the trade secret with a cloak of
exclusivity through the program written and sold in object-code. 187 TRIPS
harmonizes and perpetuates this kind of copyright protection. It also reinnew materials, and
forces international trade secret protection for software,
88
other subject matters by the law of unfair competition.1
However imperfect, the disclosure requirement of patent protection
which has been refused to computer programs on the ground, inter alia, that it
would ask for the establishment of a searchable prior art register, 18 9 could
guarantee a minimum transparency of technological development. Its absence
created the need to enter into R&D cooperations for learning purposes 190 in
the first place. Instead, TRIPS even stabilizes R&D cooperations and
contributes to their possibly anticompetitive effects. Indeed, R&D
cooperations are based on an equal, but limited, exchange of technology.
Moreover, they must provide for the redistribution of the jointly acquired
knowledge. Thus, intellectual property will be used to identify and to
distinguish the knowledge retained through the combination of the knowledge
contributed to it (background) or acquired under it, as well as to determine
ownership for such new knowledge (or for knowledge acquired after the
The corresponding contractual
ternination of the cooperation). 191

186 For software, see references supra note 141; for biotechnology, see supra note 98.
187 See Ullrich, in SOFrWAREVERTRAG. supra note 17. at Teil 1, Kap. 1, § 3 I B; § 4 1 B 2.
188 See supranote 107, 108 and accompanying text.
189 See Strobos, Stalking the Elusive PatentableSoftware: Are There Still Diehr Or Was It Just a
Flook? 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 363. 418 (1993); Strobos correctly makes the point that this argument has
been used for over 30 years making it ever more powerful as a self-fulfilling prophecy, but making it ever
more insidious as well.
190 See Basedow, supra note 182, at 11. But the learning capabilities required for cooperation (see
HAusler et al., supra note 183 at 50) should suffice to also learn from patent disclosures, since these must
enable any person skilled in the art to make and use the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112; GATT TRIPS art. 29
1.
191 See Gordon Key Issues in Contractingfor the Development of Joint and Derived Products. 11
COMP. L.J. 1 (1991); Ordover. A PatentSystetfor Both Diffusion and Exclusion. 5 J. ECON. PERSp. 43.
55 (1991); UNCTAD. R & D COLLABORATION AGREEMENTS AMONG ENTERPRIsES: A LEGAL AND

CONTRACTUALANALYsIs, UNCTADIITD/TEC/2. Nov. 30, 1992, No. 48, 90. 102; Ullrich, Auslegung und
Erganzung der Schutzrechtsregeln gemeinsamer Forschung und Eniwicklung, GRUR 1993, 338; WIPO.
JOINT INVENTIVE ACTIVITY GUIDE 11 (1984).
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arrangements are central to independent competition, the successful
92
cooperation and its termination, or to re-enter new or other cooperations. 1
However, these arrangements can work only if they are based on a
mechanism for exclusive appropriation, as is the case with intellectual property protection. Moreover, they will work better for international R&D
cooperation if the parties can expect such intellectual property to work
equally well everywhere. Thus, TRIPS not only contributes to the need for
joint R&D, but also facilitates contracting for it.
By the same token, the very fact that jointly developed technologies
benefit from intellectual property protection of the kind made internationally
available and effective by TRIPS sheds fresh doubt on the legitimacy of R&D
cooperations. This is so because their possibly anticompetitive effects do not
depend solely on the foreclosure of R&D competition between the partners or
on the distribution of markets for the exploitation of the joint R&D results
between the participants. The latter may or may not be accomplished and
perfected through the allocation of intellectual property protection and user
rights, which have received some attention of antitrust authorities. 193 Rather,
anticompetitive effects will also result from the impact on competitors who
194
join R&D forces.
In this respect, copyright- and unfair competition-enhanced trade secret
protection will contribute to deter competitors from individually competing
against the group. Rather, competitors will resign because of the opacity of
technological development created by the insider network, or attempt to join
this or another group, thus strengthening the propensity to networkdependency of strategic partnering.195 Either result is more than likely, since
192 See OECD, TECHNOLOGY AND THE ECONOMY - THE KEY RELATIONSHIPS (1992) at 76; Bidault
& Cummings, Innovating Through Alliances: Expectationsand Limitations, 24 (1) REs. & DEv. MGMT.
33, 39; Hakanson, Managing Cooperative Research and Development: PartnerSelection and Contract
Design 23 R & D MOMT Number 3, at 273, 281 (1993); Peterson, supra note 183, at 258.
193 See EC-Commission, Reg. 418/85 (EEC) of December 19, 1985, on the application of art. 85
(3) of the Treaty to categories of research and development agreements (OJEC. 1985 L 53. 5), art. 3. 4;
and for a comparative analysis of U.S., European and German antitrust law regarding joint R & D, see
Fuchs, KARTiLLRECHTLICHE GRENZEN DER FORSCHUNGSKOOPERATION 85 (1989) et passim; Ullrich.
KOOPERATIVE FoascHuNo UND KARTEt.LRECHT 50 (1988) et passim, [hereinafter KOOPERATIVE

FoRscHuNG].
194 For an empirical and economic analysis, see MONOPOLKOMtmsSION, WETrBEWERBSPOLMK
VOR NEUEN HERAUSFORDERUNGEN, HAUPTGUTACHTEN 198811989 337 (1990); Tdger, TECHNOLOGIE- UND
WETBEWERBSPOLITISCHE WIRKUNGEN VON FORSCHUNGS- UND ENTWICKLUNOS(FuE)KOOPERATION
(198%95 See Basedow, supra note 182. at 22. 106;
and for the intensification and cluster-building of
strategic alliances, see OECD, TECHNOLOGY AND THE ECONOMY - THE KEY RELATIONSHIPS (1992). at
227; Hagedoorn, in ON THE INCREASING ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN CORPORATE POLICY. SPECIAL ISSUE.
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enjoys equal and
the competitor has to face a group which, thanks to TRIPS,
96
effective intellectual property protection in any market. 1
From this perspective, TRIPS should be considered an invitation of
European and U.S. antitrust authorities to review their permissive attitude visA-vis R&D cooperation agreements. Once it is recognized that joint R&D is
entered into as a way to follow the rapid development of technology, its
allegedly pro-competitive nature is no more than a verbal camouflage of
97
unreflected antitrust abstention. 1
What remain from the arguments in favor of R&D cooperation are
costs and risks of individual research and development, and rationalizing effects of cooperation. The latter must be judged on their merits, 198 but the
former will have to survive close examination. It is the very purpose of intellectual property protection to cover the risks of R&D projects with a
sufficiently broad demand on the market. TRIPS provides such protection in
a harmonized and effective form for the world market. Thus, if the wellprotected world market cannot reward a R&D project, why should it be
allowed to go on at all? Does cooperation make it a better project, or just
simply a better insured project? Competition is no exercise in risk insurance.
It is an exercise in risk-taking. Cooperation that spreads precisely those costs
and risks over a number of partners undermines the market-oriented selection
process, which is what intellectual property-based competition is all about. It
also tends to over-reward R&D by alleviating its risks while increasing its
rewards. 199
INT'L J. TECH. MGMT. 88 (Gold ed. 1991); Hagedoom & Schakenrad, Leading Companies and Networks

ofStrategic Alliances in Information Technologies, 21 RES. POL'Y. 163 (1992).

196 Therefore, the fear both small and developing countries show in view of the geographical concentration of strategic alliances in the trade areas appears plainly justified, see OECD, TECHNOLOGY AND
THE ECONOMY - THE KEY RELATIONSHIPS (1992) at 232; Hagedoorn, in ON THE INCREASING ROLE OF
TECHNOLOGY IN CORPORATE POLICY, SPECIAL ISSUE, INT'L J. TECH. MGMT. 87 (Gold ed. 1991);
UNCTAD, R & D COLLABORATION AGREEMENTS AMONG ENTERPRISES: A LEGAL AND CONTRACTUAL
ANALYSIS. UNCTADITD/TEC/2, Nov. 30, 1992, sub No. 193, Delapierre, Les accords inter-entreprises,
partageou partenariat?REV. ,C IND. 1991, 135, 150.

19 7 See Basedow, supra note 182, at 68; but see id. at 76; Fuchs. supra note 193, at 57; for the
obvious relationship between R & D and corporate strategy see Ransley & Rogers, A Consensus on Best R
& D Practices,RES. TECH. MGMT., Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 19.

VOR
NEUEN
HERAUSFORDERUNGEN.
WETrBEWERBSPOLITIK
198 MONOPOLKOMMISSION,
HAUPTGUTACHTEN 1988/1989 at 355 (1990); Immenga, in GWB-KOMMENTAR § I annot. 464 (Immenga
& Mestmacker eds., 1993); Ullrich, supra note 193, at 170.
199 See in more detail Ullrich, KOOPERATIvEFORSCHUNG, supra note 193, at 163, 167. It is true.
of course, that intellectual property does not allow equally broad appropriation of R&D results for all
industries (supra note 149). But such differences rarely have been made the distinctive criterion in
antitrust analysis of R&D cooperation, and if so, it cannot be used to indiscriminately admit cooperation
where appropriability is imperfect. Such imperfections are inherent in intellectual property protection as
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Technology Policy

Similarly, the relationship between national technology policy and
internationally harmonized intellectual property protection needs more critical
attention. Roughly speaking, technology policy represents that part of
industrial policy which attempts to link science policy to competition policy
by subjecting both to common objectives of general economic welfare; particularly, increased international competitiveness of national industry. In
formulating the nation or Community wide R&D programs which specify the
means to achieve the policy goals, 200 technology policy will seek the advice
of science and industry. It will attract various scientific institutions to
201
participate in R&D programs by financing appropriate scientific projects.
Technology policy also invites science to consider economic and social needs
when defining its own projects, and it will support any efforts of science to
202
transfer its economically useful results to industry for exploitation.
its limitations are supported by its pro-competition rationale (see references supra notes 9, 71). Therefore,
imperfect appropriability as such is no reason justifying per se cooperation, and it certainly is no reason to
allow cooperation as a compensation for the absence of national industrial policy, contra: Jorde & Teece,
Innovation, Cooperation,andAntitrust, in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVENESS 47, 50, 52, 61
(Jorde & Teece eds., 1992); Rule of Reason Analysis of Horizontal Arrangements:Agreements Designed
to Advance Innovation and Commercialize Technology, 61 ANTrRUSTL.J. 579, 591, 594, 617 (1993).
200 See for the European Community its third "Framework Programme for Research and
Technological Development of April 23, 1990" (O.J.E.C 1990 L 117, 28) which is based on. 130q EECTreaty (as amended by the Unitary European Act), and its 4th Framework Program 1994-1998 O.LE.C
1994 L 126, 1; for a recent account of the R&D Policy see Sharp & Pavitt, Technology Policy in the
1990s: Old Trends and New Realities, 32 J.C.M. STUD. 129 (1993); Eilon, R&D Policy in the European
Community, INT'L J. TECH. MGMT. 1992, 113; for Germany, BUNDESMINISTERIUM FOR FoRSCHUNG UND
TEcHNOLOGIE, BUNDESBERICHT FORSCHUNG 1993 [hereinafter BUNDESBERICHT FORSCHUNG 1993], BTDrucks. 12/5550. 8, 137; Ullrich. PRiVATREcHTSPRAGEN, supra note 83, at 159; and for a comprehensive
comparative analysis Ergas, Does Technology Policy Matter? in TECHNOLOGY AND GLOBAL INDUSTRY
191 (Guile & Brooks eds., 1987); NELSON (ed.), NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMs: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS, 3 (1993) [hereinafter NELSON].
201 See for the EC, STARBATTY & VETTERLEIN, DIE TECHNOLOGIEPOLITIK DER EURoPAIsCHEN
GEMEINSCHAFT, 50 (1990) [hereinafter STARBATTY & VETTERLEIN]; with respect to ESPRIT specifically
(which was a model, but is no rule) Ledeboer, The ESPRIT of a European R&D Network, INT'L J. TECH.
MaMT., 493 (1992); Mytelka, States, Strategic Alliances and International Oligopolies: The European
ESPRIT Programme, STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS - STATES. Finis AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION 182

(Mytelka ed., 1991); Peterson, Technology Policy in Europe: Explainingthe Framework Programme and
Eureka in Theory and Practice, 29 J. C. M. STUD. 269 (1991): for Germany see Ullrich.
PRIVATRECHTSFRAGEN, supranote 83, at 160.
202 The EC has set up two specific programmes intended to promote a technology transfer infrastructure (the Strategic Programme for Innovation and Technology Transfer - SPRINT - of April 17,
1989, O.J.E.C. 1989 L 112, 12, as prolongated by Council Decision of December 20, 1993. O.J.E.C. 1994
L 6) and to support the transfer and exploitation of Community-sponsored R&D results (Valorisation et
utilisation pour l'Europe) of April 29, 1992, O.J.E.C. 1992 L 141, 1), see Goodman, ExploitationofR&D
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Industry, in turn, will not only benefit from this technological orientation of
scientific infrastructure, 20 3 but will also obtain direct support for its own

R&D efforts to the extent that it is willing to adapt them to government's
technology programs. 204 As these programs must attain objectives which, by
definition, will not be achieved by operation of competition alone, and as they
must be accepted by industry which is supposed to execute the corresponding
R&D projects, they must strike a balance between the public interest and
industry needs as the government perceives it. They generally do so on the
basis of subsidies paid to industry for following the government's R&D
programs. Consequently, technology policy is an exercise in both influencing
industry's competitive conduct (and, to a certain degree its competitive
structure205) and controlling the government's interference with market
development. The latter aspect is dealt with by competition policy under the
heading of antitrust control over concentration and cooperation, and
Community or GATT-control over state aids (subsidies). 206 The purpose of

this paper is not to discuss either of these forms of control,207 but only to
Results in Community, LES NOuvELLES 33 (Mar. 1993). Both programs are bound to be merged under the
4th Framework Programme. In Germany, technology transfer infrastructure has been developed
systematically since the 1970s (see Ullrich, PRIVATRECHTSFRAGEN, supra note 83, at 251) as has been
done in other European countries, see Ullrich, Staatliche Forschungsforderungund Patentschutz im
Vergleich in Ullrich et al., STAATICHE FORSCHUNGSFORDERUNG UND PATENTSCHUTZ IM
INTERNATIONALEN VERGLEICH: WESTEUROPA 331 (1985). ; Kuhlmann. THE UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY AND
RESEARCH-INDUSTRY INTERFACES IN EUROPE (1991).

203 In Germany, technology policy traditionally is multi-focused, the basic aim being to provide for
a broad science base and a multi-faceted institutional infrastructure that will result in the setting of
'innovation - and competition - minded" framework conditions for industry, see BUNDESBERICHT
FoRSCHUNo 1993, supra note 200, at 14, 34.
204 See generally for the EC, STARBATTY & VErrERLEN 64; Ullrich, Forschungs- und
Technologiepolitik, in Dauses (ed.), HANDBUCH DES EuRoPAiSCHEN WIRTSCHAFrsREcHTs 1993 (looseleaf)
sub. note 12; Elizalde, Legal Aspects of Community Policyon Research and TechnologicalDevelopment
(RTD), 29 COMMON MKT .L. REV. 309, 327 (1992) [hereinafter Elizalde]; for Germany, Ullrich.
PRIVATRECHTSFRAGEN, supra note 83, at 214; and for a comparative analysis the country reports and the
conclusion, in NELSON supra note 200, at 3, 506.
205 See as regards assembler - subcontractor relations ('lisintegrations'), Commission of the EC,
Growth, Competitiveness, Employment - Present Challenges and Paths into the 21st Century, Whitebook,
Bull EC 611993, sub. 2.3 (p. 71), 4.3 (p.97, German Version); as regards participation of large and small
enterprises, see Rechnungshof der EG, Sonderbericht Nr. 6/93 Oiber die Europaischen Forschungs- und
Entwicklungsprogramme auf dem Gebiet der Informationstechnologien (ESPRIT-Programme), ABIEG
1994 C 45, 1 sub. 2.13; STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS- STATES, FIRMS AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION 197
(Mytelka ed., 1991); 4th Framework Program, Annex III (O.J.E.C. 1994, L 126, 1. 6).
206 For Community control over Member States R&D policy see art. 92, EC-Treaty and
Commission of the EC, Community Frameworkfor State aidsfor research and development, O.J.E.C.
1986, C 83, 2; KLODT, FORSCHUNGSPOLmK UNTER EG-KONTROLLE. 35 (1988); with respect to the
GATT/IWTO - control over subsidies see infra text, at note 217.
207 See Ullrich in Dauses, HANDBUCH DES EUROPAISCHEN WtRTSCHAFrsRECHTS, sub. No. N 21
with references; German writers have tended to analyse the EC-F&T Policy under the perspective of
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point out the relevance which international intellectual property protection
may have in both respects.
An illustrative example is presented by the situation where science and
industry meet to serve goals of technology policy, namely joint science and
industry R&D projects. They constitute a hallmark of national technology
policy in England and Germany, and they represent a basic variety of the
European Community's Research and Technology Policy, which focuses on
promoting cross-border R&D cooperation between national enterprises and,
possibly, national research institutions. 208 Assistance for such joint projects
generally is given by way of a contract or a grant covering fifty percent of the
eligible project costs, and enterprises calculating on the basis of actual costs
while public research institution mostly receive a hundred percent refund of
the additional costs caused by the project to eliminate overhead. The funding
arrangement either is made by the project partners separately with the
government or jointly by all members of the group. 209 In any case, the joint
R&D project has to be executed on the basis of a cooperation agreement
which implements the conditions to which the grant of the subsidy is subject
and which, therefore, is largely governed by the rules the government has
defined or accepted for the cooperation. Obligations of the project partners,
include duties to cooperate and to regularly report on the project's progress.
A central point of these obligations is the exchange of pioprietary information
and of intellectual property, and the determination of ownership and user
rights relating to the project's R&D results. The national and European
approaches to solving these issues vary.2 10
"Ordnungspolitik", see STARBATTY & VETrERLEiN 121; Oberender. Mdglichkeiten und Grenzen einer
europaischen Forschungs- und Technologiepolitik: cine ordnungstheoretische Analyse, Ifo-Studien 1993,
327.
208 For England see, Ward, COLLABORAMVE RESEARCH INTHE UK: THE LINK PROGRAMME. 2 (2)
IrELt PROP. Bus. 6 (1990): Department of Trade and Industry/LINK-Secretariat. First Report of the
LINK Steering Group, London 1992; for Germany, BUNDESBERICHT FORSCHUNG 100 (1993); for the EC
see art. 130£ 2, 130 g, 2, EC-Treaty; Ullrich in Dauses, supranote 204, at N 13 with references.
209 The former is true for Germany, where the partners receive grants by separate and unilateral
decision of the government, while the latter is true for the EC, see Commission of the EC, Directorate
General XIL Model Contract for Research and Development of October 1, 1988 [hereinafter Model
Contract]; for a general review of contract conditions of the EC see Elizalde supra note 204, at 333;
Ullrich in Dauses, HANDBUCH DES EuROPAISCHEN WIRTSCHAFrSRECHTS, sub. N 15; for England, see
SEGAL & QUtNCE, INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF LINK 24 (1991); for Germany, see Ullrich,
PRIVATRECHTSFRAGEN, supra note 83, at 174; for a summary account of all the three models Ullrich,
Rules on Ownership and Allocation of Intellectual Property in Joint R&D Projects of Science and
Industry: Some Principles and Comparisons, in MrrrEILUNG-.N DER MAX-PLANCK-GESELLSCHAFr 1994
(forthcoming) [hereinafter Rules on Ownership).
210 See Ullrich, Rules on Ownership. supra note 209. An international comparison including in
part Japan and the United States has been made by UNCTAD. In the United States, the allocation of
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The British model requires industry partners to freely exchange nonexclusive intellectual property licenses for the project R&D and to license
background and foreground intellectual property to each other on a non-exclusive basis so that each project partner will be able to fully exploit his own
results. Academic partners are requested to leave exploitation to industry
partners for a reasonable compensation. 2 11 The government claims no rights
to the results, but requires industry partners to actually exploit them within
three years or else grant a license to third enterprises willing to exploit the
results.
The German model has a different starting point. An academic or industrial grantee must give a non-exclusive license to any third party at a
discounted royalty rate. 212 However, as industry partners request a preferential status in view of their contribution to the cooperation, they actually
enjoy a privileged position for access to proprietary information (notably
software) and to background rights for a consideration which is limited to
bearing patenting costs and the remuneration of academic employee inventors. Consequently, there is little interest in third party access to academic
results and to industry's R&D results for the simple reason that competing
against the privileged group on the small basis of some bare and nonexclusive rights is hardly attractive.
The EC-model is hardly more competition-minded. 2 13 The very
elaborate rules on ownership, exploitation, and dissemination of results are
based on the equivalence of the contribution partners make to the project.
They, therefore, provide for a full exchange of proprietary information and
intellectual property on foreground and background knowledge for research
purposes as well as for purposes of exploitation on the basis of non-exclusive

licences. However, the conditions vary according to whether the licences
relate to foreground or background knowledge and according to the license
purpose. The position of academic institutions as a partner basically does not
differ from that of industry partners. They may, however, ask for an equitable
intellectual property resulting from joint government-industry R&D also remains an issue. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 200; Bill to Amend the Stevenson - Wydler Technology Innovation Act (S. 1537), 46 BNA-PTJC 507,
522 (1993).

211 The attribution of ownership and the distribution of user rights has become controversial in
England, both in the context of LINK. See generally SEGAL& QUINCE, supra note 209, at 26, 48.
212 For this basic approach and its implications see Ullrich, PRIVATRECHTSFRAGEN, supra note 83,

at 329, 361; see also Ullrich,Rules on Ownership, supra note 209.
213 See Model Contract, supra note 209, at annex 11, pt. B, art. 14; Tomlin, R&D: A PRACTICAL
GtYIDE TO THE EC "MODEL" CONTRACT, I INTELL. PROP. Bus.. Number 5. at 2 (1989); Ullrich in Dauses,
HANDBUCH DEs EUROPAIsCHEN WIRTSCHAFrSRECHTS, sub. N 17.
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compensation where they are structurally unable to commercially exploit the
R&D result. In addition, the rules contain a set of licensing obligations vis-Avis third parties which vary according to the purpose of the license and the
status of the would-be-licensee within the same R&D program, a related
program, outside a R&D program, but inside the EC. For practical matters,
third party access appears to be limited, and the more so as, again, a third
party's interest to compete against the privileged members of the group
hardly will be very keen. Consequently, the only burden the partners have to
bear is that they must exploit the R&D results within a reasonable period of
time to be agreed upon in the contract, and even this obligation does not
appear to be very strict.
These three models for resolving intellectual property issues of publicly
supported R&D cooperations may, of course, raise questions of equity as
between the parties, and of opportunity for the technology policy goals
pursued by public assistance. 2 14 They have been outlined here as a
demonstration of the purely instrumental function assigned to intellectual
property in the context of a technology policy that directly does what was
done by the specific, though less immediately enforceable purpose of intellectual property protection, namely to promote technological progress. One
may question whether public R&D subsidies should be granted on top of both
intellectual property protection and the reduction of R&D risks resulting from
cooperation. 2 15 This question would appear to be the more justified as
mandatory third party licensing never has been an adequate compensation for
the distortion resulting from public assistance. In the context of a discussion
of international intellectual property protection, however, the form of the
argument might be different. The fact that national intellectual property will
be harmonized due to TRIPS modifies the weight of the argument just
mentioned. The reward which the group may expect from its R&D efforts
must be calculated in terms of the internationally protected markets at which
the R&D efforts are aimed. As their size grows, the need to grant public
assistance should diminish. In fact, what happens is the contrary; public
assistance for R&D is granted in the interest of enhanced international
competitiveness. 2 16 Consequently, the more a project is directed at world
214 See Ullrich,Rules on Ownership, supra note 209.
215 See Ullrich, KOOPERATIVE FORSCHUNG, supra note 193. at 166; GUTBERLET. ALTERNATIVE
STRATEGIEN DER FORSCHUNGSFORDERUNG 27 (1984).

216 See art. 130f EEC-Treaty (as amended by the Unitary European Act), and its 4th Framework
Program 1994-1998 O.J.E.C 1994 L 126, 1, preamble and the outline in annex III on the various fields of
actions (specific programme areas); BUNDESBERICHTFORSCHUNG 1993, supra note 200, at 8, 43, 90.
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markets, the easier it becomes for it to get public support. What is more, as
the support is granted for the sake of international competitiveness of the
domestic industry, and as it is paid out of the domestic taxpayer's money,
harmonized international intellectual property serves to protect these domestic
interests in global markets. Put differently, international intellectual property
legally protects the extraterritorial effects which national or European
technological policy produces on global markets, and ironically, it may do so
on the basis of territoriality with all its side-effects as described above.
If technological property is to be taken as seriously as TRIPS takes it,
and if its fundamental function as an incentive to invest in R&D is recognized, then account must be taken of the fact that it is itself an expression of a
technology policy, the effects of which may not be neglected when assessing
the compatibility of an interventionist, subsidy-based technology policy with
trade and competition. Unfortunately, GATT fails entirely in this respect.
Article 8 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures makes
R&D subsidies non-actionable when they relate to "industrial research" or
"pre-competitive development" and do not exceed seventy-five percent or
fifty percent of eligible costs respectively. 21 7 Whatever the significance of
these notions may be in terms of dynamic competition for innovation, 218 they
clearly embrace results which are patentable or copyrightable. In fact,
patenting activities usually precede product commercialization by years, 219
and copyright comes into being with any design of new software. 220 Both
protect their subject matter, or more precisely, the potential markets for the
217 Footnotes 27-28 of the Agreement contain the following definitions:
27)The term "industrial research" means planned search or critical investigation aimed at
discovery of new knowledge, with the objective that such knowledge may be useful in
developing new products, processes or services, or in bringing about a significant improvement
to existing products, processes or services.
28)The term "pre-competitive development activity" means the translation of industrial
research findings into a plan, blueprint or design for new, modified or improved products,
processes or services whether intended for sale or use. including the creation of a first prototype
which would not be capable of commercial use. It may further include the conceptual
formulation and design of products, processes or services alternatives and initial demonstration
or pilot projects, provided that these same projects cannot be converted or used for industrial
application or commercial exploitation. It does not include routine or periodic alterations to
existing products, production lines, manufacturing processes, services, and other on-going
op rations even though those alterations may represent improvements.
218 See supranote 197.
219 See Faust, supra note 176. at 155, 161: Hausser, Schutzrechte und technische Information als
Oberlebensstrategieftr das einzelne Unternehmnen und die Volkswirtschaft. Mitt.PaLAnw. 1984, 121.

124, see also references supranote 176.
220 In fact it is the design phase of software development where copyright protection is the most
easily obtained, see BGH of May 9,1985. 17 INT'LREV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 681 (1986).
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subject matter for twenty and fifty years respectively. Their very purpose is
to establish a close, protective link between 'pre-competitive" R&D and
product commercialization. GATT may not be ready fully to cover R&D
subsidies, as these may not be easily separated from science policy. Possibly,
it may have been wrong to cover them at all while not covering other forms of
interventionist technology policies.22 1 But to grant them a whole-sale
exemption irrespective of the effect they will produce when combined with
internationally harmonized intellectual property protection is really an
the totally unequal knowledge
unsatisfactory approach, and the more so when
222
base of countries is taken into consideration.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The GATT-WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property has its origin in fear and aggression. Widening competition in world

markets, broad confrontation of innovation and imitation as a result of the
development of new technologies, 223 the true or presumed decline of
American competitiveness, 224 and the rise of customer countries to the status
not only of low cost competitors, but also of technological rivals225 all have
contributed to the imposition of TRIPS on the GATT agenda by the major
industrialized countries, especially the USA. As a consequence, the TRIPS221 Like innovation pioneering government procurement or the establishment of public enterprises
or agencies charged with the introduction of new technologies (Nuclear energy, spacecraft etc.).
222 See Die Forschungist heute ein Monopol reicher Lander, BddW, Feb. 15, 1994, at 8 (quoting
the First UN-Science Report, UNESCO STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1993, sub. 5).
223 See US International Trade Commission, Economic Effects of Intellectual Property Right
Infringenient,22 J.WorLD TRAD no. 4, at 101 (1988); OECD, GLOBALISATION, supranote 34, at 89.
224 See Nelson & Wright, The Rise and Fall ofnAmerican Technological Leadership: The Postwar
Era in Historical Perspective, 30 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1931 (1992); Nelson, U.S. Technological
leadership: Where DidIt Come From and Where Did It Go?. 19 REs. POLY. 117 (1990); Vernon; Coping
with Technological Change - US Problems and Prospects,in TECHNOLOGY AND GLOBAL INDUSTRY 160

(Guile & Brooks eds.); Ullrich in Beier, Schricker. GATT or WIPO, loc. cit. at 131 et seq. with
references.
225 See Park, Trading Blocks and U.S.-Japan Relations in Pacific Trade and Co-operation, 15
WORLD COMPETrlON no. 3, at 39, 53 (1991). The patenting strength of Japan is well known. See Pavitt
& Patel, The InternationalDistribution and Determinants of Technological Activities, 4 OxFORD REV.
ECON. POL'Y no. 4. at 35, 42 (1988); Mlusser, Schutzrechte und technische Information als
Oberlebensstrategiefar das einzelne Unternehinen und die Volkswirtschaft, MitLPat.Anw. 1984, 124.
Japan's general technology policy and recent stress on basic research is also well known. See Dunn,
Wettbewerbsfahigkeit und Technologiepolitik - Die japanischenErfahrungen, 212 Jhb. Nat6k Stat. 292
(1993); Hirano, Publicand Private Support of Basic Research in Japan, 258 SCIENCE 582 (1992). But
other countries have made comparable efforts to become genuine technology competitors. See Kim &
Dahlmann, Technology Policyfor industrialization:An Integrative Framework and Korea's Experience,
21 REs. POL'Y 437 (1992).
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Agreement is essentially of a defensive character as evidenced by the refusal
to adopt a rule of international exhaustion, by the weight implicitly given to
the principle of territoriality, by the little attention given to the public interest
in avoiding or invalidating unwarranted protection, and by the abstention from
balancing intellectual property harmonization through harmonized rules on the
anticompetitive use of intellectual property. The very causes leading to the
TRIPS-Agreement, however, and the rationale underlying its operation,
indicate that TRIPS is as much a matter of international trade as of
international competition policy. These are all reasons, therefore, to implement and apply TRIPS in conformity with the principles governing
dynamic competition. This is also a lesson to be learned from regional economic integration. The trade-enhancing effects of free trade areas or of
customs unions entirely depend on the existence and maintenance of interstate
competition and its market-integrating virtues. As territorially distinct and
differently defined national intellectual property protection may both serve
and impede market integration, it generally will not be subject to harmonization efforts aimed at preventing distortions of competition resulting
from the different national intellectual property definitions. Rather, it will be
accompanied, if not preceded by, the enactment of common antitrust
principles for the maintenance of effective competition, 226 or even by the
enforcement of specific rules on free trade that do overcome the principle of
territoriality. 227 In addition, attempts may be made to unify intellectual
property protection. 228 The common reason for all these rules is that trade
liberalization and the establishment of fair conditions of competition by
adequate or equivalent levels of intellectual property protection will result in
the expected benefits for the public interest only if the private actors entrusted
with the enjoyment of these liberties really are held to actually play the
game.

229

TRIPS, if put into operation, may of course be read defensively or procompetitively. If read pro-competitively, two basic lines of thinking emerge.
One is that, in view of the substitution of national intellectual property
policies by their international harmonization, the principle of territoriality
226 See art. 1501 et seq. NAFrA-Agreement; art. 53 et seq., Protocol 21, and annex XIV EEAAgreement: art. 63 Europe Agreement with Poland; art. 62 Europe Agreement with Hungary. All these
cites can be found supra note 127.
227 Art. 30. EC Treaty, see references supra note 167.
228 See, e.g., Community Trademark by Regulation 40/94 (EC) by the Council of December 20.
1993, O.J.E.C. 1994 L 11. 1; Proposed Community Patent (O.J.E.C. 1989 L 401, 1) and Community
Design (O.J.E.C. 1994 C 29, 20).
22
9CompareUllrich, 23 INT'L. REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHTL. 586 (1992).
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must give way to its being understood as a conflict of law rule for globally
open markets. The other is that internationally adequate levels of intellectual
230
property protection as corroborated by regional and bilateral harmonization
constitute a new frame of reference for the determination of the intellectual
property/competition-interface that ought to be fully taken into account in the
very interest of achieving the ultimate objectives of TRIPS.
To be sure, whether TRIPS will actually reach its adequate levels of
protection still is uncertain. 23 1 Conversely, there will always be a genuine or
alleged need for better protection. 232 In fact, as the recently expanding
economic analysis of intellectual property protection promises more and
broader insights into its operation as a stimulus to innovation, 233 and as intemational trade theory is just about to adjust itself to the effects technical
change may have on trade, 234 one may wonder whether our understanding of
the interaction between intellectual property and trade really is deep enough
to warrant such a sweeping international harmonization as will be brought
about by TRIPS. It probably would have been wiser to have institutional
competition decide how intellectual property systems should develop internationally in the face of the changing natures of technologies and of a
persistent diversity of national economic settings. 235 All that TRIPS offers in
this respect is an option to nationally extend protection (art. I para. 1(1)). Its
survey mechanism leaves little if any room for individual experiments by
members as regards, e.g., alternative systems of software protection, 236 and
the less so as its dominance by the intellectual property conceptions of one or
a few members with high technology interests hardly holds promise for much
liberalism. However, just as the international extension of intellectual
property protection must be taken into consideration when assessing the
230
231
NAFTA's
232

Compare supra note 127.
The risks of a 'elective exit" of dissatisfied members are well described with respect to
intellectual property rules by Gonzales, 34 HARv. INT'L. L. J. 308 (1993).
With respect to the elusive nature of new technologies compare Simon, 4 FORDHAM INTELL.

PROP., MEDIA& ENT. L. REv. 273 (1993).

233 See references supra note 9, at 71; Audretsch, Intellectual Property Rights: New Research
Directions, paper presented at the Conference on 'Intellectual Property Rights and Global Competition"
Wissenschaflszentrum Berlin fUr Sozialforschung, Apr. 21-22, 1994.
234 See Ruigrok, Paradigm Crisisin InternationalTrade Theory, 25 J.WORLD TRADE 77 (1991);
DOSi, PAvrrr & SOETE, THE ECONOMICS OF TECHNICAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 1990.
passin. in particular 44, 237.

235 See Foray. Production and Distributionof Knowledge in the Innovative System: A New Role
for Intellectual PropertyRights, paper presented at the Conference on 'Intellectual Property Rights and
Global Competition", Wissenschaflsszentrum Berlin far Sozialforschung, Apr. 21-22, 1994.
236 Compare supra notes 111, 113, 130, 141, 189. However. there is a window in TRIPS for the
most obvious "new" Technology, i.e. for biotechnology, in art. 27(3).
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compatibility of inter-firm cooperation or of R&D subsidies with competition
policy, so must the possible weakness or inadequacy of TRIPS not be taken
as an invitation to compensation by R&D cooperation or technology policy
measures aimed at increasing the incentive to innovation by financial
assistance or the artificial enlargement of the capacity to internalize R&D
results. 237 Like national intellectual property protection, TRIPS offers a
balanced system of non-interventionist incentives to innovate that is based on
competition and that excels by its competitive neutrality. 238 As we know
much more about the negative effects concerted practices may have on innovative competition than we know about optimizing innovation by
cooperation or by intervention, any interference with the competition rationale
of TRIPS risks undermining the attainment of its objective: fair trade with
quality goods.

237 Compare with Jorde & Teece, supra note 199; and with UNCTAD, supra note 196.

collaboration favors "countervailing cooperation." See Jorde & Teece. supra note 199, at 57.
238 Seesupra note 83.

R&D

